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Abstract
Combinatorial Game Theory (CGT) is a branch of game theory
that has developed almost independently from Economic Game Theory
(EGT), and is concerned with deep mathematical properties of 2-player
0-sum games that are defined over various combinatorial structures.
The aim of this work is to lay foundations to bridging the concep-
tual and technical gaps between CGT and EGT, here interpreted as
multiplayer Extensive Form Games, so they can be treated within a
unified framework. More specifically, we introduce a class of n-player,
general-sum games, called Cumulative Games, that can be analyzed by
both CGT and EGT tools. We show how two of the most fundamental
definitions of CGT—the outcome function, and the disjunctive sum
operator—naturally extend to the class of Cumulative Games. The
outcome function allows for an efficient equilibrium computation un-
der certain restrictions, and the disjunctive sum operator lets us define
a partial order over games, according to the advantage that a certain
player has. Finally, we show that any Extensive Form Game can be
written as a Cumulative Game.
∗urban031@gmail.com, partially supported by Aly-Kaufman fellowship.
†reshefm@ie.technion.ac.il
‡zick@comp.nus.edu.sg
1
1 Prologue
Consider a game, where 2 players, Alice and Bob, alternate in removing
identical objects, say pebbles, from a common heap, given some restriction
on the available actions, and given some ‘winning condition’. Usually, the
players compete in achieving a certain goal, such as removing the last peb-
ble, or grabbing the largest number of pebbles, and the final result is usually
sensitive to who starts. Such games are well studied in an elegant niche
of classical game theory, called Combinatorial Game Theory (CGT). Here
we will de-emphasize the usual appeal of patterns and combinations, and
instead lay a foundation for a bridge to main stream game theory, i.e. Eco-
nomic Game Theory (EGT), via multiplayer Extensive Form Games. The
main contribution of this paper is conceptual, which makes it somewhat
different from many theoretical papers. Most of the space is dedicated to
exploring various definitions, that enable us to reconcile diverging concepts
and modelling assumptions in CGT and EGT, and now under one umbrella.
In particular, we bridge the facts that finite games in EGT are rooted trees,
i.e. have an initial state, and that in CGT states are not a-priori coupled
with a current player. We justify our definitions with examples, and we
provide theorems with short and straight-forward proofs. In order to illus-
trate the basic concepts and motivate the later theory building, we begin by
investigating some concrete situations.
Imagine that, at their turn, a player, Alice or Bob, must take either 2 or
3 pebbles from a single heap. The ultimate goal of the game will vary. Later
we will increase the number of players to n > 2.
Normal play. In this example a player who at their turn cannot move
loses. Thus, if Alice start from a heap of size 4, she should remove 3 pebbles.
Misère play. In this example a player who at their turn cannot move wins.
Thus, if Alice start from a heap of size 4, she should remove 2 pebbles.
Scoring play. In this example the player with a larger number of pebbles
when the game ends, wins. Or more precisely, one of the players, say Alice,
is the maximizer, and Bob is the minimizer; a common score is updated
during play by the number of pebbles they remove. If Alice (Bob) collects 2
pebbles then the score increases (decreases) by 2, etc. Hence, if Alice starts
from a heap of size 4, she should remove 3 pebbles, the game ends, and the
final score is 3. If they remove 2 pebbles each, the game ends in a draw with
a total score of 2− 2 = 0.
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Squirrel play. This is self-interest cumulative play. Here, there is no win-
ner, but each squirrel attempts to gather the largest possible number of
pebbles (nuts) for themselves. Thus, in our example, the first squirrel (Al-
ice) should remove 3 pebbles, and the final utilities will be (3, 0). This is
not a zero-sum game; all partial cumulations, and in particular the final cu-
mulations, are ordered pairs of nonnegative integers. If Alice starts instead
from a heap of size 7, she should collect 2 instead of 3 pebbles. Why? (See
Figure 1.) And this holds form Normal play and scoring play too, but in
misère play you will lose whatever you play from a heap of size 7.
Auction play. This game will be revisited in Example 4. An auctioneer
has set up the following 2-player auction: the starting position consists of 4
bidding-pebbles and a pair of initial bids, and the players may increase their
bids by collecting either 2 or 3 bidding-pebbles. Each player has a utility
function of the form: 0 utility if they do not win the auction, and otherwise
the utility is 4−‘their accumulated bid’, i.e. in case Alice wins the auction,
4−(her initial bid + all her play bids). (If no player wins the auction, then
both players get utility 0). If the initial bids are (0, 0) then Alice, playing
first, should bid 3 to win the auction, and the utilities will be (1, 0). However,
if the initial bid is (1, 0), then Alice should bid 2, because a bid of 3 would
(in spite of winning the auction) give utility 4− 3− 1 = 0, whereas a bid of
2 suffices to win the auction, and her utility will be 4− 2− 1 = 1. Therefore
the best-play bid, from a heap of size 4, may depend on the initial bids (or
current cumulations), and, as we will discuss further, such situations cannot
happen in the 4 first examples.
Wealth play This is again Normal play, but where the players can re-
move any number of pebbles that does not exceed their current cumulation.
Suppose that the heap is 3, and the current cumulation is (2, 2). Then the
first player loses. If the heap is 3, and the current cumulation is (2, 1), then
Alice will win if she starts by removing 1 pebble, but she loses if she starts
by removing 2 pebbles. Suppose next that the heap is of size 6, and the
initial cumulation is (1, 1). If Alice starts, then the next position is 5, (2, 1),
followed by Bob, playing to 4, (2, 2). Now, Alice loses if she removes 2, but
she wins if she removes 1. (Indeed, this is a 0-sum game).
We believe the squirrel, auction and wealth play situations are new to
combinatorial games’ study. Observe that, in auction play, although no part
of the ruleset depends of the current cumulation (here initial bid), play in
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Pure Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (PSPE, every player selects the action
maximizing her utility, in every subtree of the game) depends on the current
cumulation. Before continuing, the reader may wish to justify that the first
four examples do not exhibit such behavior; in fact, as we will see, the first
four examples (generalized) have smaller complexity due to the fact that
their utility functions have simpler formulations. We emphasize that, in the
auction play example, we chose the most direct utility function to justify the
goal of that game.
7; (0, 0)
5; (2, 0)
3; (2, 2)
1; (4, 2) 0; (5, 2)
2; (2, 3)
0; (4, 3)
4; (3, 0)
2; (3, 2) 1; (3, 3)
0; (5, 2)
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
2
3
2
Figure 1: The picture illutrates the self-interest game where the squirrels
remove 2 or 3 nuts, and where the initial heap size is 7. In each node we
show the current cumulation for each player. The cumulations at the leaf
levels are also the utilities of the players. The thick edges mark the Pure
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of this game. The starting player has a small
advantage, by adapting non-greedy play.
The squirrel play example is obviously not zero-sum play, and although
very simple, we believe that the general class of such self-interest games has
not yet been studied in the literature of Subtraction Games (or elsewhere).
This is probably due to the fact that the combinatorial game tradition is
rooted in recreational games, and most recreational games are (though of
as) 0-sum games; although the classical recreational game Monopoly has
ingredients of self-interest squirrel play, it is more of a type of wealth play,
because the ranges of available actions depend on accumulated amounts of
money. Of course Monopoly is not a combinatorial game, because it has
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random moves and hidden cards, but the analogy is close enough to motivate
a natural class of wealth games in our discussions.
All six examples may be included to a super class of combinatorial games.
When we enlarge combinatorial games in this manner, we wish to have defini-
tions match the existing literature of game theory at large, and in particular
we will adapt to the conventions of Extensive Form Games. This is a natural
way forward, since all combinatorial games, with a given starting player, are
Extensive Form Games. The class of Extensive Form Games is much larger
than that, but, in fact, they do not encompass combinatorial game theory
for other reasons, that we will explain in more detail as we go along.
The auction play example shows that when we vary the utility function,
we may end up in situations where a PSPE action depends on the history
of the game, i.e. in our setting a player’s ‘current bid’ (also called called
current cumulation), although the ruleset itself has no history dependency,
apart from the move function (which is here alternating play).
In simpler cases, such as the first 4 examples, one may ignore the current
cumulations while computing the various PSPEs (and adding initial cumula-
tions only after the PSPE computation). In the sixth example, wealth play,
then obviously one cannot ignore the current cumulation while computing
even the available moves. In the two last examples, there is no meaning to
assigning ‘a game value’ to a heap size alone, whereas in the four first exam-
ples, essentially, this is the correct approach. Our main interest in this paper
will be to study the area between the four first examples and the auction
example. We will do this by developing a ruleset large enough to encom-
pass any Extensive Form Game, and small enough to not obscure the main
direction, and distinctions we wish to address.
Before we move on, let us challenge the reader with a sample game,
where the game is a composition of games, namely one game of each kind
in the above sample games. Say Alice and Bob play the composite game
A+B+C+D+E+F , where all game components are played on a heap of
size 4, with subtraction set {2, 3} and initial cumulation (0, 0), except for the
game F , which is played on a heap of size 4, with initial cumulation (1, 1).
The ‘+’ signs indicate that, when the game ends, we will add the component
utilities. Hence the players seek to maximize the sum of the utilities of the
component games.
Let us specify the various utility functions:
A: a player with the last move wins one point, and the other player loses
one point;
B: a player with the last move loses one point, and the other player wins
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one point;
C: Alice gets p points, and Bob gets −p points, if the final score is p;
D: a player gets p points if they end up with p pebbles in their own pocket;
E: the player who wins the auction gets 4−‘winning bid’ points and the
other player gets 0 points, and in case of no winner, both players get
0 points;
F : a player who cannot move, in any component of the composite game,
loses one point, and the other player wins a point.1
The total utility for each player when all games have ended is the sum of the
utilities in the component games. How does best play change if wealth play
instead is worth −10 and 10 points respectively (and the other games stay
the same)?
Such hybrid games have not yet been discussed in the (CGT) literature.
The general line of thinking has been that, in order to play games together, in
a so-called disjunctive sum, one needs to fix a ‘winning condition’ or ‘scoring
convention’ or something similar.2 Our new model makes such distinctions
obsolete, and allows for various generalizations of these initial ideas, and
note that this generalization is possible because of a merging of concepts
from previously ‘different’ game theories.
2 Introduction
Since the introduction of Chess-like games and their recursive solution by von
Neumann, noncooperative game theory has developed in two almost inde-
pendent directions. Mainstream work in economics started to consider games
with multiple players and general utility functions (EGT), and generalized
game values by considering subgame perfect equilibrium. Meanwhile, combi-
natorial game theory (CGT) continued to explore (2-player, 0-sum) games,
with complete and perfect information, as abstract mathematical entities,
by defining various operations such as game addition and game comparison,
which take into account games’ underlying combinatorial structure. Another
interesting feature of CGT is that it deals with games that people can ac-
tually (and often do) play for recreation. In fact, both the Milnor theory
1This convention will be neatly encoded in our utility functions to come, by using the
idea: when there is no move in any component, then specifically there is no move in F .
2For appealing game comparison, one usually restricts the set of games further.
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[25] (on positional games), and the breakthrough via Normal play theory
[7, 1], took inspiration from endgame studies in the classical eastern game of
Go, and CGT disjunctive sum theory was born in these ways (we now know
that Milnor’s positional games are a subclass of Normal play games where
infinitesimal games have been excluded; see [18] for a discussion). In this
context one should mention that Berlekamp has fused CGT with EGT by
playing out endgames of combinatorial games together with coupon stacks,
to estimate their temperatures (see [3, 2] for more on these topics), but this
topic leads towards a different direction than this work.
In both strands of the literature much work is dedicated to understand
the outcome of a game when players play rationally, but often using different
mathematical tools and even more different terminology. In this paper our
purpose is to start building bridges between CGT [33] and “economic” (or
mainstream) game theory—in particular Extensive Form Games and sub-
game perfect equilibrium.
We study a multiplayer, general-sum extension of the classical Subtrac-
tion Games [1] (a variation of Nim), called Cumulative Games.
A zero-sum variation of Cumulative Games is known as Cumulative Sub-
traction (CS) [5], introduced in Stewart’s Ph.D. Thesis [31] (also published
in [32]), and with more recent work in [5]. Thus, from a CGT perspective, we
are proposing a much delayed jump from zero-sum to general-sum games in
the spirit of the historical jump in EGT, mastered first by von Neuman [28]
(zero-sum) and then by von Neuman and Morgenstern [29] (general-sum),
and others. From an EGT point of view, we propose a method to analyze
economic style generalized combinatorial games using concepts from CGT,
such as the outcome function and disjunctive sum play [33]. In CGT, games
can be naturally added and compared [33] and we show how these ideas carry
over into our more general setting.
2.1 The three layers of a Cumulative Game Form
To be able to apply both CGT and EGT concepts, an n-player Cumulative
Game Form (CGF) will be defined in three layers, to be specified in the
various settings. To begin with, a ruleset is a set function, which is defined
on an infinite heap space, as in layer 1. It specifies what the n players can do,
what actions they can take on the heaps, and what consequently happens to
individual cumulations. Moreover, a turn function is given.
1. A (d× n)-dimensional heap space (CGT game space) is an infinite set
of d-tuples of finite heaps, where each heap, in every tuple, memorizes
an n-tuple of player cumulations on that heap.
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2. A heap position (CGT game position) fixes a position from the heap
space, and it applies to any starting player;
3. A grounded position (EGT game state). This is a heap position, to-
gether with a specified starting player.
Note that, on the two first layers, a game cannot yet be played; although
sometimes, the ruleset alone, which requires only layer 1 is called ‘a game’.
The heap positions on layer 2 are sometimes called game components, as
they are prepared for so-called disjunctive sum play together with other
game components. The important concept of a CGT outcome function is
defined on layer 2. Layer 3 games cannot be played in a disjunctive sum,
but a disjunctive sum game is of course grounded when play starts.
On layer 3, a game can be played, but without any incentive. For a Game
Form to be a game, a utility function is required. Various incentives will be
given by utility functions, and player maximization of individual utilities is
the purpose of a game. As we will see in Section 5, a grounded position,
together with player utilities, is an (EGT) Extensive Form Game. Here,
we wish to emphasize the distinction between the three first layers, and in
particular the often overlooked gap between layers 2 and 3. When a utility
function is added to a CGF, we call it a Cumulative Game.
2.2 Subtraction Games
The models we develop in this paper are motivated by the classical CGT
Subtraction Games. The over arching idea is that there is a heap of pebbles
and two players, who alternate removing pebbles given some subtraction set
S ⊂ N = {1, 2, . . .}. If the size of the heap is x ∈ N0 = {0, 1, . . .}, then
the current player acts by removing a ∈ S pebbles, and leaves the position
x − a > 0 for the opponent. If there is no such a ∈ S, then the game ends,
and the result is determined, by some prescribed convention, for example,
as is common in CGT, a player who cannot move loses.3 Apart from the
winning condition, our games are all based on this simple idea. To the
authors best knowledge, a general-sum variation of Subtraction Games (or
any other combinatorial game) have not been studied before in the literature.
2.3 Bridging the Fields
We think of an n-player combinatorial game position in terms of an n-tuple
of EG states, one for each starting player, p0 ∈ [n]. Here, we already encoun-
3This is the Normal play convention; see also the Section 10.
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tered an important distinction between EG and CG, a combinatorial game
position is defined with respect to any starting player (layer 2), whereas an
EG state has assigned a given player to start (layer 3). For an EG there
is a priori no immediate/obvious way to attach another starting player to a
game state. For a combinatorial game, it is required that any player may
start from any given game position. For example, if we view a given Chess
position (without asking the question “who is to play?”) the position may
often apply to any player as starting player (apart for special situations, such
as if one of the player’s King is in check). A typical CGT-question for a given
2-player combinatorial game position is: “Would you prefer to start, or going
second?” There are several more or less subtle distinctions between the two
fields (that share the same heading “Game Theory”). In this study we will
assume perfect and complete information, thus remaining close to standard
CGT concepts.
2.4 Motivation from CGT
Before moving forward, we want to briefly explain the importance of two key
concepts from CGT that this paper aims to extend: the outcome function
and the disjunctive sum operator. Both concepts are reviewed, through the
(original) setting of Normal play, at last, in Section 10.
The outcome function An outcome function assigns a value to every
position in the game (i.e., it operates on layer 2), which essentially describes
who wins under optimal play from this position. Therefore it is similar to
the pure subgame perfect equilibrium in EGT, except that in CGT it turns
out to hold much more information about the game, as we explain next.
Disjunctive sum An interesting feature of combinatorial games is that
they can be added. Intuitively, playing the game G + H means that the
current player must make a move in exactly one of those games (consider for
example a situation where G is some Nim position, and H is a Chess opening
position). Under the Normal play convention, a player that cannot move in
any of these games loses the game. One important question is which classes
of games are closed under the disjunctive sum operation.
Partial order The two concepts above induces a partial relation over zero-
sum games within a given class, where G ≥ H if the outcome ofG+X is never
worse for the maximizing player than the outcome ofH+X. For Normal play
this definition turns out to be particularly powerful: every two games can be
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compared constructively, by essentially playing them out together. Normal
play games constitute a group structure, where the negative of a game G
is the game −G, where the two players have swapped positions. The main
theorem of Normal play says that G ≥ H if and only if player Left (the
maximizer) wins the composite game G + (−H) playing second. Moreover
this result implies a bijection of Normal play games with the four outcome
classes (see Section 10), a unique feature within combinatorial games.4
On a note, some subclasses of Normal play games have even stronger
properties. For example, every impartial (symmetric) game G, however
complicated, is equivalent (under the above relation) to some single-pile
Nim game of size ℓG. This means not only that the same player wins in
G and in ℓG, but that we may replace the game G in every possible context
(e.g. G+Chess) with the Nim pile ℓG, and the results would stay the same.
The foundation for this result is the classical Sprague and Grundy theory
[35, 11] where all games are impartial, and it is not hard to see that it can
be extended to all Normal play games.
Cumulative play An intuitive idea of cumulative play is that “you get
what you take”, and you put it in your own pocket, perhaps for later use.
This idea is simpler than a typical zero-sum setting [5], where the players
accumulated scores must be compared to access the utility of play. In a
purely self-interest setting no comparison is required. In a self-interest set-
ting, it is more natural to allow for several players, whereas in a zero-sum
setting two players is the generic setting. Accumulation of points can have
various other interpretations, as is discussed in auction play from the Pro-
logue, which is revisited in Example 4, where ‘cumulations’ are interpreted
as bids in an English auction type setting, and where we discover that ra-
tional play might depend on cumulations, even when the ruleset does not
depends on them. In a more economic setting one would most likely want
to study Cumulative Games, where action sets depend on accumulations,
4Although, this simple and elegant idea fails for other universes of games, it has still
been demonstrated to lay a foundation for larger classes of CGT, namely, first Guaranteed
Scoring games [18, 17], and then for Absolute CGT [20, 21], that includes various misère
play settings. By generalizing to general sum games (such as self interest), however,
the Normal play foundation seems to break, mainly because games cease to be purely
competitive, and the concept of a Normal play order embedding, as paved the way forward
towards Absolute CGT, does not appear to make much sense in the larger class we study
here. The big open problem is what to do instead to have interesting subclasses of games
with constructive game comparison, if possible at all. (Another possible direction would
be to weaken the overlaying idea that games comparison must include the “for all X” part,
if this can be justified by interesting applications.)
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as in wealth play in the Prologue. But we will not enter that territory in
this paper. Here, we instead focus of how far we can extend the Cumulative
Subtraction/scoring-play games from [5], and still maintain a tractable (or
dynamic) outcome function, that essentially only takes as input the heap
(and not the cumulation). The prospects of comparing cumulative games in
a broader economic setting is an ultimate goal of bridging CGT and EGT.
This work lays a foundation for such studies.
The previous player A general remark, before we start; all through this
study, the player about to move, the current player (the starting player), here
denoted p˜,5 will be defined via a previous player p, and this terminology is
standard in CGT literature, where the setting is mostly alternating play.6
The turn function will be generalized further, by adapting conventions from
EGT; in either case the analysis will depend on the notion of a previous
player. As we discussed above, EGT does not require the notion of a previous
player. In the hybrid, we develop here, this distinction becomes obsolete.
2.5 Outline and contribution
In Section 3, we define a simple first class of 2-player general sum combi-
natorial games called Cumulative Subtraction, by using the three layered
structure mentioned above. We analyze this class using both EGT and CGT
tools, and in particular, we introduce the CGT-inspired outcome function,
and demonstrate its usefulness. Thereby most of the ideas of this paper
(except for disjunctive sum) are already present in this section in a greatly
simplified form.
The next sections are dedicated to generalizing these ideas. In Section 4
we present our general class of Cumulative Games, followed by some more
background on Extensive Form Games in Section 5. We demonstrate how
Cumulative Games can capture both classical zero-sum Subtraction Games
and our newer class Cumulative Subtraction, as well as many other varia-
tions.
Section 6 generalizes the notion of a CGT-type outcome function, by
adapting to extensive form terminology, whenever applicable. Here, we study
the conditions under which it is well defined and efficient.
5In cyclic play.
6The current player is traditionally called the “next player”, which is a bit unfortunate,
because in a current position, the previous player and the next player would be the same
player, which is not what is intended. Hence, we will not adapt to that convention here.
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In Section 7 we return to the most important concept from CGT, which
is disjunctive sum. We show that the disjunctive sum operation can be natu-
rally defined on Cumulative Games thanks to the three-layered structure and
various closure properties, and thereby inducing a CGT-type partial order
over games. This, we hope, would be a cornerstone in extending Sprague’s
& Grundy’s, Milnor’s and Conway’s et al. classical discoveries from 0-sum
games to more general classes.
We close the loop back to EGT in Section 8, by showing that every Exten-
sive Form Game is strategically equivalent to some Cumulative Game. We
conclude with discussion some key issues and future directions in Section 9.
3 Warm up: Cumulative Subtraction Games
We will next define a variation of the subtraction game based on scores. As
we reserve the term “scoring game” exclusively for zero-sum games, we name
the new class of games by Cumulative Subtraction (CS) (although this term
is also used in the 0-sum setting in [5]). We start with 2-player games, and
generalize it later in Section 4. For 2-player Cumulative Subtraction, we call
the players by player 1 and player 2.7
We build onto the outline with the three layers described in the intro-
duction.
Definition 1 (2-player Cumulative Subtraction). A one heap 2-player Cu-
mulative Subtraction Form is defined in three layers. The ruleset R is a given
function, S : N0 × {1, 2} → 2N, where S(0, p) = ∅, together with update
rules of cumulations, as specified in (1).
1. The heap space is of the form N0 × R2;
2. A heap position on the ruleset R is a tuple (x, (C1, C2)), where x ∈ N0
is the heap size, and where Ci ∈ R is the accumulated size of player i’s
pocket;
3. A grounded position is a tuple (x, (C01 , C
0
2 ), p), where x is a heap size,
C01 , C
0
2 are initial cumulations for the respective players, and where p
is the previous player.
In every non-terminal grounded position (x, (C1, C2), p), the current player
p˜ chooses an action a ∈ S(x, p), and if player 1 is the current player, the
7In Section 10, the CGT tradition is emphasized by calling Player 1 by Left and Player 2
by Right.
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new position is (x − a, (C1 + a,C2), 1), and in case of player 2 the current
player, the new position is (x− a, (C1, C2 + a), 2). That is, player p˜ takes a
pebbles from the heap to her own pocket, and passes the position forward to
the other player. A grounded position is identified with its sets of options,
which, assuming that player 1 is the current player, is
(x, (C1, C2), 2) = {(x− a, (C1 + a,C2), 1) | a ∈ S(x, 2)}, (1)
and similar for player 2. The game ends when the players have reached a
terminal position (xT, (CT1 , C
T
2 ), p) = ∅, that is, whenever S(x
T, p) = ∅.
Observe that Definition 1 assures that every game will end, but it does
not specify who wins, or what are the players’ utilities. This allows for several
variations which we discuss below. We use the superscript ‘T’, whenever we
wish to emphasize that a position, heap size, cumulation etc. is terminal.
3.1 From a CGT-type interpretation
As we stated at the beginning of this section, our CS game is inspired by
the traditional CGT-type Subtraction Game with Normal play rules (see
Section 10). Closer to our approach is the more recent zero-sum scoring
variation in [5], where each player i aims to maximize the utility CTi −C
T
−i,
the difference of cumulations when the game ends. To align the CGT model
with the EGT one, we will introduce a self-interest variant (squirrel-play in
the Prologue), where each player simply aims to maximize their own terminal
cumulation. Even though the players remove objects from a common heap,
there is often a clear distinction.
3.2 Towards an EGT-type interpretation
In mainstream game theory, each player aims to maximize their own util-
ity. We define the self-interest utility of each player i in a terminal state
(x, (CT1 , C
T
2 ), p) as equal to C
T
i (more general utility functions will be intro-
duced in Section 4). Therefore, every ruleset S together with a grounded
position (x, (C1, C2), p), and a utility function, induces an Extensive Form
Game. To decide on the game solution, we apply the pure subgame perfect
equilibrium (PSPE) solution concept. We provide a detailed definition in
Section 5, but for now it is sufficient to recall that PSPE means that ev-
ery player selects the action maximizing her utility, in every subtree of the
game. See Figure 2 for a self-interest interpretation of Cumulative Subtrac-
tion. The PSPE is unique because we assume that players have well defined
13
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p˜ = 1
p˜ = 2
p˜ = 1
Figure 2: This is a reiteration of Figure 1, to exemplify the notation in
this section: the extensive form game induced by the self-interest symmetric
game with subtraction set S = {2, 3} and the grounded position (7, (0, 0), 2)
(where player 1 starts). In each node we show x; (C1, C2). The cumulations
at the leaf levels are also the utilities of the players. The thick edges mark
the PSPE of this game.
preferences for the other players. For example, in case of two players, they
may be (i) antagonistic, that is, in facing equal utility, they aim to minimize
the utility of the opponent, or they may be (ii) friendly, and this is when they
maximize the other player’s utility in case of indifference. This is the first
variant of a combinatorial game (that we are aware of) that is not zero-sum.
In case of zero-sum games, instead of PSPE, we will refer to the simpler, but
equivalent notion of optimal play.
3.3 The outcome function
A key concept in CGT is the outcome function. The outcome function de-
pends only on the ruleset, and assigns an ‘optimal play value’ to every (un-
grounded) game position. That is, it operates on layers 1 and 2 of the game,
and had not yet any obvious relevance to (typically layer 3) EGT contexts.
Notably, in symmetric zero-sum games, the outcome function captures the
advantage to the starting player in every position (but it is indifferent to
whether this is player 1 or player 2).
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Outcome functions were originally defined for 2-player Normal play CGT
(see Section 10); it is essentially a pair of (von-Neumann [28]) minimax
algorithms, and first used in the setting of scoring combinatorial games by
Milnor [25]. It was reconsidered in Stewart’s PhD thesis [31] for symmetric
Subtraction Games, and simplified in [5]. See also [9] for a generalization
of Milnor type games, and [18, 17] for interesting connections of scoring
combinatorial games with Normal play games. Another reference is [13]
for scoring games where all play sequences have the same parity. Most of
this work was done in the context of the disjunctive sum theory, which we
review in Section 7, where we also prove that our ruleset satisfies important
properties of combinatorial games such as additive closure.
Property 1 (Symmetric Rules). Rules are symmetric if, for all positions,
the move options are independent of player.8 In this case, we write S(x, p) =
S(x).
The outcome function of the symmetric zero-sum variation was recently
defined in [5].9 It is particularly appealing in its concise one-line definition.
Definition 2 (Outcome, Symmetric, Zero-sum [5]). The outcome of a heap
of size x is ozs(x) = max({−ozs(x− a) + a | a ∈ S(x)} ∪ {0}).
Note that the outcome is ozs(xT) = 0 if S(xT) = ∅.
Proposition 1 (Symmetric, Zero-sum, [5]). Consider a ruleset S in sym-
metric zero-sum Cumulative Subtraction. At any grounded position
(x, (0, 0), 2), suppose that
(
xT,
(
CT1 , C
T
2
))
is a terminal position under opti-
mal play. Then, the utility is ozs(x) = C
T
1 − C
T
2 > 0.
Proof. This is immediate by Definition 2.
Although the rules of game are more natural for self-interest than zero-
sum ditto, the self-interest outcome function will require some extra consid-
eration, namely the requirement of a tie-break rule for each player, in case
of indifference.
The outcome at every position x should specify a value for both players,
in the case that each of them starts, and thus, in the general case, we will
need an n×n matrix for the outcome osi(x) (indeed this is what we do later
in Section 4). For now we can use simpler notation.
8In CGT, the common term for symmetric is “impartial”; but those games are not
‘impartial’ in the economic sense, so we avoid this traditional CGT terminology here.
9Outcome functions have been defined for other scoring games under various names in
the literature, e.g. [25, 12, 9, 33, 18, 17].
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(a) Heap sizes
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(b) CGT outcome
(0-sum)
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0 0
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3
3
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3
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3
2
(c) CGT outcome
(self-interest)
(0, 0)
(0, 0) (0, 0)
(4, 3)
(3, 2)
(2, 0)
(3, 0)
(3, 0)
2
3
3
2 2
3
2
3
2
Figure 3: To the left: symmetric cumulative subtraction with S = {2, 3}
represented as a DAG played from a heap of size 7. The middle picture
displays the zero-sum outcomes, and to the right, the general-sum outcomes.
The double edges indicate which child determines the parent’s value
The outcome is defined with respect to player 1 as starting player, thus
p = 2 (by symmetry, the analogous result when player 2 starts is just revers-
ing players’ utilities). However, to simplify notation, for symmetric rulesets
we write S(x) = S(x, 1) = S(x, 2).
Definition 3 (Outcome, Symmetric, Self-Interest, Antagonistic). Consider a
ruleset S in a self-interest Cumulative Subtraction game, under antagonistic
play. The symmetric self-interest outcome of a heap of size x is osi(x) = (0, 0)
if S(x) = ∅, and otherwise
o1si(x) = max{o
2
si(x− a) + a | a ∈ S(x)}, (2)
o2si(x) = o
1
si(x− a
′), (3)
where
a′ = argmin
a∈S′(x)
o1si(x− a), (4)
and where S ′(x) ⊆ S(x) denotes player 1’s set of indifference actions in
perfect play. The symmetric self-interest outcome of heap size x is the pair
osi(x) = (o
1
si(x), o
2
si(x)).
When play is self-interest friendly in case of indifference, instead of
argmin in (10), we choose argmax, and otherwise the definition is the same.
See Observation 6 in Section 9, for interesting discussions and conjectures
on these variations of games and outcome functions.
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Property 2 (Fixed Rules). If there are subsets of the natural numbers
S1, S2 ⊂ N such that for all x ∈ N0, for p ∈ {1, 2}, S(x, p) = Sp ∩ {0, . . . , x},
then the ruleset S is fixed.10 In case of fixed rulesets, we abuse notation and
denote, in case of symmetry, S = Sp, and otherwise S = (S1, S2).
Example 1. Consider the fixed ruleset S = {2, 3}. The presentation in
extensive form (of a particular grounded position, i.e. layer 3) is in Figure 2.
All heap sizes and the moves between them (i.e., layer 1 up to x = 7)
are in Figure 3(a). Note that the tree does not include cumulations. The
computed outcome function under both zero-sum and self-interest variants
is displayed in Figures 3(b) and (c), respectively.
Note that the representation is smaller than the naïve representation
in Figure 2, and yet it still allows for computing the PSPE. The realized
outcome in both variations is 7 7→ 5 7→ 2 7→ 0.
Both these representations are nice, but due to the layers 1 and 2, It
is much more convenient to present the outcomes in an easily extendable
table. Next, we display the zero-sum and self-interest outcomes, for the fixed
symmetric subtraction game S = {2, 3}. (For this ruleset, the self-interest
outcomes do not depend on the particular tie-breaking rule.)
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ozs(x) 0 0 2 3 3 1 0 1
osi(x) (0,0) (0,0) (2,0) (3,0) (3,0) (3,2) (3,3) (4,3)
For example ozs(6) = max{−ozs(3) + 3,−ozs(4) + 2} = 0, and similarly
osi(6) = o˜si(4) + (3, 0) = (3, 3), if o˜ indicates swapped entries. This can
also be useful when the game tree/DAG becomes complicated (exponen-
tial/quadratic growth compared to linear). In fact, these type of ‘outcome
tables’ inspired this work; we wanted to explore how far we can extend the
games, while still having a ‘one-line table computation’ of outcomes. And
note that these type of tables prints all outcomes in the spirit of layers 1 and
2 in the game representation, not just the ones that belong to a particular
grounded (layer 3) game, as in the DAG representation or, as is the case in
the extensive form representation, where the tree only concerns computation
of the value at the root, for a given starting player. For example, if we later
want to display further outcomes, we will require o(6), which is mossing in
the tree representations.
10In the setting of symmetric (impartial) Subtraction Games, fixed rules have also been
called Vector Subtraction Games [10], and Invariant Games [8].
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The general (not necessarily symmetric) zero-sum outcome function has
a very similar expression as Definition 2. The only difference is that the
outcome function now requires a move flag corresponding to the previous
player index of the ruleset and we may no longer assume that player 1 starts.
Definition 4 (Outcome, Zero-sum [5]). Given a ruleset S in symmetric zero-
sum Cumulative Subtraction, the outcome of a heap of size x is ozs(x) =
(ozs(x, 2), ozs(x, 1)), where
ozs(x, 2) = max({ozs(x− a, 1) + a | a ∈ S(x, 2)})
and
ozs(x, 1) = min({ozs(x− a, 2) + a | a ∈ S(x, 1)}).
Next, we define the (not necessarily symmetric) self-interest variation (in
antagonistic play). Again, although the self-interest utility function seems
more natural for cumulative games, the possiblity of indifference situations
requires extra care. The outcome is succinctly represented by a 2×2 matrix,
because, similar to Definition 4, it is important to distinguish ‘who is the
current player?’.
Definition 5 (Outcome, Self-interest, Antagonistic). Consider a ruleset S
in a self-interest Cumulative Subtraction game, under antagonistic play. The
self-interest outcome of a heap of size x, for p ∈ {1, 2}, is osi(x, p) = (0, 0) if
S(x, p) = ∅, and otherwise
o1si(x, 2) = max{o
2
si(x− a, 1) + a | a ∈ S(x, 2)}, (5)
o2si(x, 2) = o
1
si(x− a
′, 2), (6)
where
a′ = argmin
a∈S′(x,2)
o1si(x− a, 2), (7)
and where S ′(x, 2) ⊆ S(x, 2) denotes player 1’s set of indifference actions in
perfect play;
o2si(x, 1) = max{o
1
si(x− a, 2) + a | a ∈ S(x, 1)}, (8)
o1si(x, 1) = o
2
si(x− a
′, 1), (9)
where
a′ = argmin
a∈S′(x,1)
o2si(x− a, 1), (10)
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and where S ′(x, 1) ⊆ S(x, 1) denotes player 2’s set of indifference actions in
perfect play. The self-interest outcome of heap size x is the matrix
osi(x) =
[
o1si(x, 2) o
2
si(x, 2)
o1si(x, 1) o
2
si(x, 1)
]
The ith row of this matrix concerns player i as starting player, and the jth
column concerns player j’s game value, depending on who starts.
Example 2. Let us display the initial zero-sum and self-interest outcomes,
for the fixed Cumulative Subtraction game S = ({2, 3}, {1, 4}):
S x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
{2, 3} ozs(x, 2) 0 0 2 3 2 3 4 −1
{1, 4} ozs(x, 1) 0 −1 −1 1 −4 −4 −2 −1
{2, 3} osi(x, 2) (0, 0) (0, 0) (2, 0) (3, 0) (3, 1) (4, 1) (5, 1) (3, 4)
{1, 4} osi(x, 1) (0, 0) (0, 1) (0, 1) (2, 1) (0, 4) (0, 4) (2, 4) (3, 4)
That is, player 1 subtracts 2 or 3, whereas player 2 subtracts 1 or 4. So far,
the self-interest outcomes do not depend on the particular tie-breaking rule
(because initially there are no ties). Let us make some immediate reflec-
tions on these initial values, and indeed, by below Proposition 2, the rows
in the table represent game values of the corresponding grounded positions,
whenever (C01 , C
0
2 ) = (0, 0). For the zero-sum variation it is noted in [5]
that all symmetric outcomes are nonnegative, but this will no longer hold in
the non-symmetric case (for example ozs(3, 1) = 1 and ozs(7, 2) = −1), and
moreover, now a player may get a zero-sum outcome larger than the max-
imum of their subtraction set, e.g. x = 6, which is not possible in case of
symmetry. We postpone study of combinatorial properties and asymptotic
of non-symmetric games, similar to and generalizing [5], and/or encourage
other researchers to take on the many interesting topics, emerging from the
definitions in this section. In Section 9, we guide the reader into some inter-
esting problems related to this section.
We conclude with an intermediate step towards general Cumulative Games.
Proposition 2 (Self-interest Cumulative Subtraction). Fix a previous player
p ∈ {1, 2}. At any grounded position (x, (C01 , C
0
2 ), 2), let (x
′, (C ′1, C
′
2)) be the
final position under PSPE play. Then, osi(x, p) = (C
′
1 −C
0
1 , C
′
2 −C
0
2 ). That
is, the utilities in PSPE play, when player p˜ starts, are C ′1−C
0
1 and C
′
2−C
0
2
for player 1 and 2 respectively.
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This will be proved in a more general setting in Section 4 (Theorems 6
and 8).
Remark 1. Greedy play means to play the largest action possible, and
sacrifice means to play some smaller action. E.g. in the PSPE play sequence
above there is one sacrifice, in the first move from a heap of size 7. The
necessity of sacrifices in certain situations was observed in [31] via a certain
periodicity conjecture, which was solved in [5].
In this study, we de-emphasize such combinatorial aspects of solutions;
instead, we wish to convey that for generalized optimal/PSPE play evalua-
tions, the convenient means is recurrence via the outcome function. Before
we move on, we review the complexity of a grounded Subtraction Game
position.
3.4 Layer 3 complexity
In general Extensive Form Games, computing a PSPE requires traversing
the entire game tree by backward induction. In the worst case, the size of
the game tree may be exponential in its height. In the case of Cumulative
Subtraction, we can merge identical nodes (e.g. in Figure 2 node [0; (5, 2)]
appears twice). Since in a tree rooted in x, with a fixed initial cumulation,
there are at most x different cumulation values for each player, we can con-
struct a DAG representation with x2 nodes, which gives us an upper bound
of O(x2) on the computation time of a PSPE, for every game starting from
a particular grounded position.11
In some cases the outcome function allows us to compute the PSPEs even
more efficiently.
Proposition 3. Consider any ruleset S with supx |S(x)| ≤ M for some
constant M . Computing all outcomes osi(x, p) for all x ≤ xˆ, can be done in
time O(xˆ). In particular, a PSPE of any Extensive Form Game grounded in
(xˆ, (C01 , C
0
2 ), p) can be computed in time O(xˆ).
Proof. The first part follows directly from Definition 5, as we can compute
the outcome function via dynamic programming.
For PSPE computation from a particular grounded position, we compute
the outcome osi(x, p) = (C1, C2). By Proposition 2, we get the terminal
utilities of both players as u1 = C1 + C01 and u2 = C2 + C
0
2 .
11In general, we do not want to fix an initial cumulation, since we are interested in the
outcomes on all heap sizes; the concept of initial cumulation belongs on layer 3, rather
than the CGT-type layers 1 and 2.
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4 Cumulative Games
In Section 3 we considered a specific class of self-interest combinatorial
games, that are based on collecting pebbles, and showed that equilibria are
efficiently computed, as expressed via the CGT outcome function.
Our purpose in this section is to define a more general class of games and
extend Proposition 2. (Later, in Section 8, we show it is general enough to
capture all Extensive Form Games.)
We first lay out the general definitions of Cumulative Games, and in
particular we generalize the outcome function.
It is quite obvious that it is not possible to compute PSPE in every
game in time that is subexponential in height, which means that a naive
generalization of Propositions 2 and 3 could not apply to all games.
Indeed, in Example 4, we follow up on the auction game example in the
Prologue, for which the proposition does not continue to hold.
This section is in preparation for Section 5, where we develop the re-
quired tools to reason about strategy profiles (in the EGT sense) for general
Cumulative Games, and in Section 6, where we define a general variant of
the outcome function (which attributes an n × n matrix of values to every
position). We identify a property of Cumulative Games, that is a sufficient
condition for a generalization of Proposition 2—see Theorem 6.
4.1 Cumulative Game Form
Let us give the general definitions for Cumulative Games. The general setting
involves n ∈ N players, d ∈ N heaps (we can think about each heap as a
different type of pebbles), reward functions, and a generalized turn function.
We adapt the notion of a ruleset to the three layers of the Cumulative Game
Form, and then at last we apply the utilities.
Definition 6 (Cumulative Game Form). An n-player Cumulative Game
Form on d heaps of pebbles F = (n, d,R,Ω, γ), is a ruleset R defined on a
heap space Ω, together with a turn function γ : Ω× [n]→ [n], which specifies
the current player.12 There are three layers in a game form:
1. The heap space, Ω = (N0 ×Rn)d;
2. The heap position, ω ∈ Ω;
3. The grounded position, (ω, p) ∈ Ω× [n], where p is the previous player.
12As a shorthand, when ω is understood, we sometimes write γ(ω, p) = p˜.
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The ruleset is the pair R = (A, r), where
(i) the action-set A : Ω × [n] → 2Z
d
specifies the set of allowed actions,
given a grounded position, possibly the empty set,13
(ii) the reward r : Ω× [n]× Zd → Rn,d depends on a grounded position ω
and an action a ∈ A(ω, p), and it is added to cumulations during play
as defined in (11).
An element ω ∈ Ω is ω = ((x1,C1), . . . , (xd,Cd)), where
(iii) x = (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ Nd0 is a d-tuple of heaps. We will sometimes refer
to the set of all heap positions as X = X(Ω). See Section 6.
(iv) the cumulation vector for each heap h ∈ [d] is Ch ∈ Rn.
A grounded position (ω, p) is terminal if A(ω, p) = ∅, and otherwise, a
grounded position (ω, p) is identified with its set of options: for all players
p ∈ [n], for all ω ∈ Ω, with ω = (x,C),
(ω, p) = {(ω(a), γ(ω, p)) | a ∈ A}, (11)
where ω(a) = (x+ a,C + r(ω, p,a)).
The cumulation C is an n× d matrix, which represents the accumulated
memory of the game, since it started, and where the entry at (i, h) is player
i’s cumulation on heap h. Row i is the current cumulation for player i on
each heap, whereas column h is the current cumulation for each player on
heap h. If, given ω, we wish to extract the cumulation vector, then we write
C = C(ω), and we may abuse notation as ω = (x,C).
Property 3 (Feasible CGF). A CGF is feasible if every grounded game
terminates.
A CGF does not yet specify players utilities. The utilities are only real-
ized at terminal positions, i.e. when the current player cannot move on any
heap. Therefore, all CGFs will be assumed feasible.
As with Extensive Form Games, the game form alone dictates how the
game can be played but not what players should do. Intuitively, players
13If A(ω, p) = ∅, then (ω, p) is a terminal grounded position as in item 3) with respect
to current player p˜ and cyclic move order say. This does not imply that ω is a ‘terminal
position’ at layer 2 because some player −p˜ might have a non-empty action set (in fact
this latter notion is not defined unless it holds for all players).
22
want to maximize their individual utilities, where the utility of each player
depends on the particular terminal position ωT, where player p˜ = γ(ωT, p)
cannot move. We omit the superscript ‘T’ as in terminal in the definition of
the utility map.
Definition 7 (Utility Map). Consider a CGF on a short ruleset. A utility
map for player i on heap h, is a function ui,h : Rn× [n]→ Rn, which maps a
terminal cumulation on heap h to player i’s utility. Player i’s utility at any
terminal grounded position (ω, p) is
ui(C, p˜) =
∑
h∈[d]
ui,h (Ci,h, p˜) , (12)
where C = C(ω). Let u(C, p˜) = (u1(C, p˜)), . . . , un(C, p˜)).
Observation 1. The utility functions are sensitive to ‘who is to play?’, and
this is useful, for example when utility should simulate Normal play ending,
on all heaps.14 The reward function is the correct means, whenever we wish
to simulate normal (or misère) play on individual heaps. See also Example 3.
Definition 8 (Cumulative Game). A feasible Cumulative Game Form F
together with a utility map u induces a Cumulative Game (F,u).
For a given previous player, we may want to be specific, and refer to a
grounded Cumulative Game, etc.
Every grounded Cumulative Game is an Extensive Form Game (see Sec-
tion 8), and so we can talk about specific strategy profiles etc.
The game is encoded succinctly in Definitions 6, 7 and 8, but let us spell
out the flow of play.
1. A game, that is a grounded position (ω0, p0) on a ruleset R, is for-
warded by the previous player p0, together with an initial d-tuple of
heap positions ω0 = ((x01,C
0
1), . . . , (x
0
d,C
0
d)).
2. At each stage of play, the current player γ(ω, p) moves from a grounded
position (ω, p), where ω = ((x1,C1), . . . , (xd,Cd)), to (ω(a), γ(ω, p))
by taking an action a ∈ A(ω, p).
(a) The heap sizes update as x← x+ a.
(b) The cumulation matrix updates as C ← C + r(ω, p,a).
3. When the game ends because the current player cannot move, then the
utility, for each player i, is realized as in (12).
14We have even more motivation in the Normal play embedded Guaranteed Scoring play
[18, 17] and Absolute CGT [20, 21].
23
4.2 Continued game examples
Our definitions allow a variety of games, and combinations of game situations
to appear in one and the same compound game. In order to stretch our
preconceived ideas a bit on which games ‘fit together’ let us expand even
further on the game example in the Prologue, and then encode it succinctly
as a Cumulation Game.
Example 3. Let us introduce a third player, Charlie, to the Alice/Bob
gamester hangout in the Prologue. And say that he plays as Bob and Alice,
but using instead the subtraction set {1, 4}, except for heap F , where all
players have the same move options. Charlie has an additional option to
add one pebble each to heaps C and F , and this does not cost him anything.
All six heaps A,B,C,D,E, F have size 4, and the play order is cyclic, Alice-
Bob-Charlie-Alice and so on. Except, there is a twist to the turn function.
If Bob collects exactly 5 pebbles, then he gets an extra turn (wherupon the
game continues in cyclic order).
The utility functions require an update, when we shift from two to three
players:
A: a player with the last move wins one point, and the other players lose
one point each;
B: a player with the last move loses one point, and the other players win
one point each;
C: Alice and Charlie get p points each, whereas Bob gets −p points, if the
final score is p;
D: a player gets p points if they end up with p pebbles in their own pocket;
E: the player who wins the auction gets 4−‘winning bid’ points and the
other players get 0 points, and in case of no winner, all players get 0
points;
F : a player who cannot move, in any component of the composite game,
loses one point, and the other players win a point each.
Let us run through a play example, to see how they might play this game,
succinctly encoded as a Cumulation Game. We have n = 3, d = 6, and the
heap space is Ω = (N0 × R3)6. The heap position is
ω0 = ((4,0), (4,0), (4,0), (4,0), (4,0), (4,1))
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The game rules are R = (A, r), where A is the action-set that specifies the
possible actions at each grounded position, and where r is the 3× 6 reward
matrix depending on the taken action, and in some cases in combination
with the current heap size (but not on the cumulation). The action set A
has various elements:
(i) The action sets are fixed subtraction sets on heaps A to E, {−2,−3}
for Bob and Alice, and {−1,−4} for Charlie;
(ii) For each player i, the action set is [Ci] ∩ [x] on heap F
(iii) Charlie has the possibility of the action a = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1)
The utilities and rewards are as follows.
(i) There are identity utilities on heaps A-D. On heap E, ui,5 = 4− Ci,5,
if Ci,5 > Cj,5, for all j 6= i, and otherwise ui,5 = 0;
(a) On heap A the reward is 0, unless −a = x, in which case ri,1 = 1
if p˜ = i, and otherwise ri,1 = −1.
(b) On heap B the reward is 0, unless −a = x, in which case ri,1 = −1
if p˜ = i, and otherwise ri,1 = 1.
(c) On heap C, the reward is r3 = (a,−a, a) if the action is a and
p˜ =Bob, and if p˜ =Alice or Charlie, the reward is r3 = (−a, a,−a);
all other reward entries are 0.
(d) Heap D has identity rewards
(e) Heap E has identity rewards.
(ii) Heap F has reward ri,6 = 0, for all taken actions, and the utility is
ui,6 = −1 if i = p˜ and otherwise ui,6 = 1.
(iii) Charlie has the possibility of the action a = (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0), which adds
one pebble on heap 1 and one pebble on heap 2, with reward 0.15
Note, that although there are moves that add pebbles to some heaps, all
play sequences terminate.16 The turn function γ is cyclic, unless Bob gets
cumulation
∑
C2,j = 5 and p˜=2, in which case γ(ω, 2) = 2, i.e. Bob must
carry on playing.
15Note, the twist this gives to normal and mise˜re play; the termination of a single heap
is not terminal for the composite game; it can be repeated, and each time rewarded or
penalized, respectively.
16If more game components are added, then we cannot assure that these local rules lead
to termination; it has to be checked again.
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Suppose that Alice starts, the game, so the grounded heap position is
(ω0, 3). She takes 3 from heap A and then Bob takes 3 from heap B. Next
Charlie takes 4 from heap C. Thus we arrived at the position
ω1 = ((2,0), (1,0), (0, (4,−4, 4)), (4,0), (4,0), (4,1)),
with Alice to move, and there are no more moves on heap 3. Next, Alice
removes a pebble from heap F , and Bob removes 3 pebbles from heap D,
while Charlie adds one pebble each on heaps 1 and 2. Thus, the new position
is:
ω2 = ((3,0), (2,0), (0, (4,−4, 4)), (1, (0, 3, 0), (4,0), (3, (2, 1, 1)))
Now, Alice takes 3 from A, Bob takes 2 from B, and Charlie takes 1 from
F , and we arrive at:
ω3 = ((0, (1,−1,−1)), (0, (1,−1, 1)), (0, (4,−4, 4)), (1, (0, 3, 0)), (4,0), (2, (2, 1, 2)))
Next, Alice plays in the auction by taking 2 pebbles, and Bob responds in
F , while Charlie adds pebbles to the two first heaps:
ω4 = ((1, (1,−1,−1)), (1, (1,−1, 1)), (0, (4,−4, 4)), (1, (0, 3, 0)), (2, (2, 0, 0), (1, (2, 2, 2)))
Finally, Alice removes the last pebble from F , Bob plays in the auction and
Charlie takes the last self-interest pebble:
ω5 = ((1, (1,−1,−1)), (1, (1,−1, 1)), (0, (4,−4, 4)), (0, (0, 3, 1)), (0, (2, 2, 0), (0, (2, 2, 3))).
This is a terminal position, since p˜ =Alice cannot move in A and B, and
all the other heaps are empty, and Alice can only remove pepples (not add).
(Observe that Bob never was required to carry on playing, because his accu-
mulated number of points never approached 5.) Let us compute the player
utilities. Alice gets u1 = 1 + 1 + 4 − 1 = 5, where the −1 is due to her
losing the Normal play in the composite game, as triggered by component
F . Similarly, u2 = −1−1−4+3+1 = −2, and u3 = −1+1+4+1+1 = 6.
Bob did not do so well: where is his first mistake?
Although this game is finite played alone (due to the cyclic turn function)
it has an infinite game tree, and cannot be added in a disjunctive sum as
defined in Section 7. (However, if we modify Charlie’s extra action to instead
a = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0,−1), then the composite game is finite.)
Recall 2-player Cumulative Subtraction.
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Observation 2. Both self-interest and zero-sum Cumulative Subtraction
from Section 3, are simple special cases of a Cumulative Game. Both of them
have the same Cumulative Game form, where there are two players, n = 2;
a single heap: d = 1,Ω = N× R2; the action set A is the negation of S; the
reward is the identity function: r(ω, 2, a) = (a, 0) and r(ω, 1, a) = (0, a);
and the turn function is alternating: γ(ω, p) = p˜ = −p. Recall that, in
the self-interest variation, ui(ω, p) = Ci whereas in the zero-sum variation,
ui(ω, p) = Ci −C−i.
In view of our results to come we will require utility to be identity, i.e.
for all players i, ui(C, p˜) = Ci. But this was not the case in Definition 1
for zero-sum symmetric Cumulative Subtraction. The situation has a simple
remedy, via the reward function (and as will be apparent we will not require
rewards to be identity, but they must be cumulation independent).
Zero-sum Cumulative Subtraction does not have identity utility when
stated as above, but we can define an equivalent game with identity utilities,
pushing the zero-sum interaction into the reward function. Let us model
zero-sum Cumulative Subtraction as a Cumulative Game with self-interest
utility.
Proposition 4. For all ω with a(ω) ∈ A, set r(ω, 2, a) = (−a, a) and
r(ω, 1, a) = (a,−a). If utilities are identity, i.e. ui(C, p˜) = Ci, then any
sequence of play gives the same utility as zero-sum Cumulative Subtraction,
as reviewed in Observation 2, and in particular, the optimal play strategies
are identical.
Proof. Obvious.
Note that the cumulation part of a heap position is not used in modelling
Cumulative Subtraction as self-interest. This should be put into contrast
with the motivating examples, Example 4 and (in particular) Example 5 in
Section 4.3. Let us introduce a central terminology in this context.
Property 4 (Ruleset Cumulation Independence). A ruleset that does not
depend on cumulations is cumulation independent.
Notice that, rewards and actions, but not utility is included in the notion
of a ruleset. (Obviously utility depends on the (terminal) cumulation.) We
have arrived at the motivating example for the main results in Section 6.
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4.3 Auction play
We discuss the variation of a Cumulative Subtraction game from the Pro-
logue, where the PSPE strategy depends on the cumulation vector. We use
the same ruleset as in the previous examples. The variation is in the utility
function.
In below Example 4, we illustrate that:
1. For a modest and economic style generalization of Cumulative Sub-
traction, we cannot hope for a general outcome representation via a
single table, as in the setting of our various examples on Subtraction
Games. We can still define an outcome function, but succinctness of
input size may get lost (because there is a history dependency in form
of a cumulation matrix). In worst case, one can use the standard PSPE
algorithm to compute the n values that comprise the outcome.
2. The second purpose hints at bridges between classical Subtraction
Games from CGT to a classical concept in EGT (similar to so-called
English auctions).
We review a variation of the one heap Auction Play example form the
Prologue in the style of the new notation. This example has a symmetric
utility function, which does not depend on the previous player, and hence we
write ui(C) = ui(C, ·) for the utility of player i.
Example 4 (Auction Play). Consider Cumulative Subtraction as in Defini-
tion 1, with a fixed symmetric ruleset S = {2, 3}, announced by an auction-
eer, and with identity rewards. The starting heap size is x0 ∈ N, and player 1
starts bidding on a single item of value v > x0. Each player has offered an
initial bid, corresponding to an initial cumulation vector C0. During play
they can increase their bids according to their actions: their bids increment
with the sizes of their subtractions.
For each player i ∈ {1, 2} the utility depends on the final cumulation
vector C, and it is of the form ui(C) = v − Ci if Ci > C−i, and otherwise
ui(C) = 0. That is, the players desire to win the auction, but with the
smallest possible margin, because they pay their bid. (Similar to “chicken
game” this game has an element of win-loss, but is still not a zero-sum game).
From a heap of size x0 = 3, with initial bid vector C0 = (0, 0) or C0 =
(0, 1), player 1 wins the item in a single turn by removing 2 pebbles, so this
is equilibrium play. However, if the initial cumulation is C0 = (0, 2), then,
in equilibrium play, player 1 must remove 3, and wins with a lower utility.
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Thus, Player 1’s PSPE strategy depends on the initial cumulation, although
the rules do not depend on cumulations (!).
The following example complements Example 4. It is a main motivation
for this study, a context that will be developed further in Section 6, where
we prove main results.
Example 5 (Modified Auction Play). Interestingly enough, Example 4 can
be rewritten with identity utility, if we elaborate the rewards to mimic the
situation. It is non-intuitive, but certainly doable for simple games like this.
Let
1. r1((3, (0, 0)), 1, 2) = 2,
2. r1((3, (0, 0)), 1, 3) = 1,
3. r1((3, (0, 1)), 1, 2) = 2,
4. r1((3, (0, 2)), 1, 2) = 0,
5. r1((3, (0, 2)), 1, 3) = 1,
and so on. Player 1 will use exactly the same strategy as in the previous
example if we set self-interest utility, i.e. u1(C) = C1. This, however,
requires that we let the reward depend, not only on the action taken (and
perhaps the heap size), but also on the cumulation. This is the second
condition, that we will disallow in a (heap size) dynamic computation of the
outcome (in equilibrium). Note for example the distinction between items 3.
and 4. In item 3. Player 1 wins and her utility is 2, whereas in item 4.
nobody wins and her utility is 0. In the latter case it is beneficial to play
instead as in item 5., which indeed coincides with Example 4.
Of course, for generic Cumulative Games, where rules might depend in a
complicated way on the player cumulations, we should not hope for more ef-
ficient computation of game values/outcomes than what is given by a generic
non-efficient PSPE computation (i.e. exponential in the depth of the game
tree). And indeed, the ‘fix’ of the PSPE cumulation dependency, via the
reward function, to obtain identity utility, only made things worse, because
now even the rules of game depend on cumulations. Of course, we know
already that sometimes this ‘fix’ gives a neat outcome, via Proposition ??.
There is a fine distinguishing line somewhere between these examples and
Proposition 4, and to make a formal treatment of this “fine line”, we will use
definitions from main stream game theory via the Extensive Form Games.
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Recall the table approach: if one would be interested instead in the PSPE
outcome, i.e. the vectors of game values of for a different initial state (with
different heap size or cumulation) the backward induction had to start all
over again. The idea of an efficient outcome function is that a computation
of game value vectors for a given heap size is universally valid, within the
same ruleset.
The distinction, following our examples, will be almost self explanatory:
cumulation independency is indeed a central property for appealing outcome
functions. But we require a solid frame work built on the theory of Extensive
Form Games. We define an outcome function for the large class of Cumu-
lative Games and then we restrict the class somewhat to demonstrate when
the ‘one-table approach’ of Example 8 still applies.
5 Extensive Form Games
In Section 4 we defined a generalization of Cumulative Subtraction Games,
and we aim to prove that it can capture all Extensive Form Games. To this
end, we begin by defining Extensive Form Games in a modular way.
Definition 9. An Extensive Form Game is a tuple G = (F,U ), where
F = ([n], S, T, s0, δ, g) is the game form with
• [n] is a set of n players.
• S is a finite set of states.
• T ⊆ S is a set of terminal states.
• s0 ∈ S is an initial state.
• δ : S → [n] is a turn function.17
• g : S → 2S is the game function.
And where U = (U1, . . . , Un), where Ui : T → R, i ∈ [n] is the utility
function of player i.
17We assign players to terminal states, even though no action is possible. Intuitively,
one reason is that the most important theory in CGT concerns Normal play, where by
definition a player who cannot move loses. In any CGT situation, the basic terminating
issue is: what happens when the current player cannot move? In misére play they win, and
in scoring play a score will be assigned, depending on who is to play. The question in the
title ,“who is the current player?”, is fundamental to the study of cumulative/combinatorial
games, not just to assign the starting player, but perhaps even more so, to punish or reward
a terminal player.
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Intuitively, player i = δ(s) is playing in state s ∈ S, and should select
the next state from g(s) ⊆ S. We assume that there are no cycles in g, and
g(s) = ∅ if and only if s ∈ T . We denote by Si ⊆ S all states such that
δ(s) = i. A state s′ is a descendant of state s if there is a path in g from s
to s′. Without loss of generality, we assume that each game state in S is a
descendant of s0.
Strategies and strategy profiles Consider an Extensive Form Game
G = (F,U ), with F = (N,S, T, s0, δ, g). A player i strategy is a function
ςi : Si \ T → S, such that ςi(s) ∈ g(s). That is, a unique action (next state)
is selected in every state such that δ(s) = i. A strategy profile is a vector
ς = (ς1, . . . , ςn). Consider any s ∈ S. We denote by ς|s the restriction of ς
on the subgame G|s, the subgame of G rooted by s. Denote by Σ(G) the set
of all strategies in G.
Terminal maps and utility maps Given a gameG, and a strategy profile
ς ∈ Σ(G)n, the terminal map τς : S → T maps any state s to the terminal
that is reached when players start from state s and follow their strategies in
ς (in the subgame G|s of G). We may omit the parameter ς when clear from
the context. Similarly, the utility map µi : Σ(G)n × S → R maps any state
to the utility of player i. That is, µi(ς, s) = Ui(τς(s)) is the utility to player
i in game G|s under strategy profile ς .
Observation 3. For any profile ς, the terminal state τς(s) is constant for
any s along the unique path the profile defines from s0 to τς(s0), and thus
so is µi(ς, s), for all i ∈ [n].
Definition 10. Consider a game G. A strategy profile ς = ς∗ is a pure
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (PSPE) if, for all s ∈ S \ T , for all i ∈ [n],
for any alternative strategy ς ′i,
µi(ς, s) > µi((ς−i, ς
′
i), s).
A game is generic if a player is never indifferent between two terminals
τ and τ ′ unless U(τ) = U(τ ′). Any game can be made generic by specifying
some tie-breaking rule (say, lexicographic) in case of indifference.
Generic games are known to have a unique PSPE utility or game value
(an n-tuple of real values),18 which can be found by backward induction.
18There may be several PSPEs leading to the same value.
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Definition 11. The game value of an Extensive Form GameG = (N,S, T, s0, δ, g,U )
is v(G) = (µ1(ς∗, s0), . . . , µn(ς∗, s0)).
In the context of grounded Cumulative Games, the value v(G) will be
referred to as the grounded value. See also Definition 13 to come.
5.1 Cumulative Games’ strategy profiles
A strategy profile σ = σ(R) for a ruleset R is an infinite set of extensive
form strategy profiles ςω,p,19 one for each grounded position (ω, p), that is
consistent, in the following sense. For every (ω′, p′) that is a descendant
of (ω, p), the strategy ςω′,p′ coincides with ςω,p|ω′,p′ . Equivalently, for any
ω ∈ Ω, and any p ∈ [n], σ(ω, p) selects an action from a ∈ A(ω, p).
Definition 12 (Cumulative Map). Consider a ruleset R, with a given strat-
egy profile σ. Then c(σ,ω, p) = C(τσ(ω, p)) is the cumulative map of the
grounded position (ω, p). Let
(ω, p) = (ω0, p0),a1, (ω1, p1),a2, . . . ,ak, (ωk, pk) = τσ(ω)
be the sequence of grounded positions and actions from ω in profile σ. Then,
for each heap h,
ch(σ,ω, p) = Ch(ω, p) +
k−1∑
i=1
rh(ω
i, pi,ai+1, δ(ωi, pi)),
and c(σ,ω, p) =
∑
h∈[d] ch(σ,ω, p).
A PSPE in a Cumulative Game (R, γ,ω, p,u) is just a PSPE in the
induced Extensive Form Game, G(R, γ,ω, p,u); we assume that game G is
generic unless otherwise stated, and thus each player has a unique preference
order of the other players. Since this is a property inherited from EG, we
strengthen it somewhat by assuring a global uniformity (layer 1).
Property 5. A ruleset is generic if each player has a tie breaking rule (pref-
erence order of the other players), which is independent of starting position
and initial player.
Definition 13. The grounded game value of a grounded Cumulative Game
(R, γ,ω, p,u) is the game value of G(R, γ,ω, p,u), v(G) ∈ Rn.
19In fact it is an uncountable set since the cumulation vectors are vectors of real numbers.
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Although this definition gives a valid and important notion for a combi-
natorial game, it is not what is usually called a ‘game value’. The reason for
this is better understood when we first develop the outcome function, which
outputs a vector of grounded game values. Even though this stronger notion,
which does not depend on the previous player, it is usually not sufficient to
describe (perfect play in) a setting of combinatorial games, namely one of
the most important properties is how a combinatorial game behaves together
with other games in the same class, using the operation of disjunctive sum.
For the discussion to proceed, one needs to define the notion of outcome func-
tion. While we do this, we will also prove some important properties of the
function, while restricting the class of all Cumulative Games appropriately.
6 Game values and the outcome function
We generalize the CGT-outcome function e.g. [1] in our setting for Cumu-
lative Games to include general-sum games, and to allow for any prescribed
strategy profile (not just the one in PSPE). The below results hold for the
multi heap situation, but, for simplicity, we choose to state and prove every-
thing for the one-heap case, to emphasize the ideas (before the technology).
Definition 14 (σ-outcome). Consider a given profile σ for a Cumulative
Game form (R, γ). Let oσ : Ω × [n] → Rn. For any grounded terminal
position (ω, p) ∈ T , set oσ(ω, p) := 0. For any non-terminal (ω, p), with
a = σ(ω) ∈ A(ω), set
oσ(ω, p) := oσ
(
ω(a), γ(ω, p)
)
+ r (ω, p, a) ,
The σ-outcome is an n× n-matrix, denoted oσ(ω), one row vector for each
previous player p.
Similarly, column vector i of oσ(ω), oiσ(ω), describes player i’s possible
results given the profile σ.
Note that, in Definition 14, the notation ω(a), is used in the sense of
being an option of ω, but without mention of the cumulation. This is inten-
tionally (alas with some abuse of notation) while the next result clarifies the
connection.
Lemma 5. Consider a ruleset R, and a given strategy profile σ. For any
grounded position (ω, p), the ith player’s σ-outcome is oi
σ
(ω, p) = ci(σ, ω, p)−
Ci(ω, p).
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Proof. Indeed, if (ω, p) ∈ T , then by definition ci(σ, ω, p) − Ci(ω, p) = 0 =
oi
σ
(ω, p). Otherwise, if (ω, p) ∈ (Ω × [n]) \ T , then
oi
σ
(ω, p) = oi
σ
(
ω(a), γ(ω, p)
)
+ ri (ω, p, a) (13)
= (ci(σ, ω
(a), γ(ω, p))− Ci(ω
(a), γ(ω, p))) + ri (x, p, a) (14)
= ci(σ, ω, p)− (Ci(ω
(a), γ(ω, p))− ri (x, p, a)) (15)
= ci(σ, ω, p)− Ci(ω, p). (16)
For (13), we use the recursive definition of the outcome function, and for
(14), we use the induction hypothesis. For (15), we use Observation 3. For
(16), recall that change in Ci after action a is exactly the reward.
The outcome function is used in zero-sum combinatorial Subtraction
Games to characterize the optimal outcomes [1, 33]. However it is also
meaningful when considering self-interest extensive-form games. Next we
show how the σ-outcome finds the vector of grounded game values in case
of generic Cumulative Games with self-interest utility.
Theorem 6. Consider a generic Cumulative Game with self-interest util-
ity, and a given strategy profile σ. Then for any grounded position (ω, p) =
(x,C , p), player i’s utility is, µi(σ, (ω, p)) = o
i
σ
(ω, p) +Ci(ω, p). In particu-
lar, this holds for a strategy profile σ∗ in PSPE.
Proof.
µi(σ, (ω, p)) = ci(σ, ω, p) (by identity utility)
= oi
σ
(ω, p) + Ci(ω, p), (by Lemma 5)
as required.
Corollary 7. v(G) = oσ∗(ω, p) +C.
Although Theorem 6 finds the grounded game values via the outcome
function, it is not yet evident whether a reasonable efficient algorithm (type
the one-row approach in the tables in Section 2) could find these values.
However, with appropriate restrictions, we can shed some light on this issue.
Recall Example 5. It points at an important property of rewards.
Property 6. If the reward does not depend on the cumulation, then the
reward is cumulation independent.
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That is, a player gets rewarded by the actions they take, possibly de-
pending on the heap size, and not by the history of the game. Note that this
notion assumes that actions are cumulation independent.
Property 7 (Heap Size Dynamic Games). If the rewards are independent of
the cumulations, we write r(ω, p, a) = ρ(x, p, a), for x = x(ω). Similarly, if
the actions are independent of the cumulations, we write A(ω, p) = A(x, p),
and the turn function becomes instead γ(x, p). A game is heap size dynamic
if the CGF, i.e. the ruleset (the actions and the rewards) and the turn
function, are independent of the cumulations in the game positions.
Note that the variations of Cumulative Subtraction as defined in Section 3
are heap size dynamic. We state one more (common) restriction of a ruleset.
Property 8 (Short Ruleset). If for any ω, and any player p the set A(ω, p)
(or A(x, p)) is finite, then the ruleset is short.
Note, that if the ruleset is short, then the sizes of A(x, p) might not be
bounded in terms of the heap size x, but, for all x, |A(x, p)| <∞.
We state the recursive computation of the σ∗-outcome for a given generic
ruleset with cumulation independent reward. The outcome function becomes
particularly simple in the case of heap size dynamic games, and implies the
existence of a dynamic programming algorithm to solve the game.20
Theorem 8 (Recursive Outcome). Consider a generic game with a short
ruleset, a self-interest utility and cumulation independent rewards, and let
o = oσ∗. For any grounded position (ω, p), if A(ω, p) = ∅, then o(ω) = 0,
and otherwise
op(ω, p) = max
a∈A(ω,p)
{op(ω(a), γ(x, p))− ρp(x, p, a)}, (17)
and if i 6= p, then oi(ω, p) = oi(ω(a
′), γ(x, p)) − ρi(x, p, a
′), where a′ is a
generic maximizing action, i.e. an action that in case of indifference follows
the preference order of player γ(x, p) in (17).
Proof. Combine Definition 7 with Theorem 6. Observe that, since the re-
wards are cumulation independent, then the max operator is well defined,
and, because the ruleset is short, there are only finitely many actions avail-
able, for any given position ω. Indeed, even if the actions are cumulation
dependent, we can find a required generic a′, and similarly for γ(x).
20Such algorithms can also have theoretical importance, as was recently shown in [6],
where dynamic programming approach lead to discovery of a simulation of a 2- player
Normal play game via a one dimensional (diamond shaped) cellular automaton.
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Observation 4 (Heap Size Dynamic Rules). If the Cumulative Game G is
heap size dynamic, then the complexity of finding the outcome, the vector
of game values is linear in the input size which is bounded by max |A(x)| ·
rank(G). In the case of a subtraction game G = S(x), this is bounded by
x2. If actions depend on the cumulations, we cannot a priori say anything
about the input size in terms of x, apart from bounding it by the number of
game states, which is in general exponential in rank(G).
7 Partially ordered heap monoids
In this section, we designate the use of letters G,H to layer 2 games, that
is (ungrounded) heap positions of Cumulative Games. Here, the notation p˜,
denotes cyclic move order, i.e., for all p ∈ [n], p˜ = p (mod n) + 1, which is
indeed the standard in CGT.21
The real elegance of CGT starts with the notion of disjunctive sum, game
comparison and the partial order induced by the outcome function [1, 7, 33].
For all this to make sense, the perhaps most important property is that of ad-
ditive closure. For if we add two games in a well defined class of games, then
their sum should remain in the same class. Traditional recreational rulesets
mostly are not additively closed, e.g. Tic-tac-toe: if we add two Tic-tac-toe
positions the resulting game does not (easily) correspond to another Tic-tac-
toe position. On the other hand, rulesets composed in the context of CGT
often satisfy closure properties,22 such as Nim, Domineering, Hackenbush,
and many others.
Let us define disjunctive sum for an n-player Cumulative Game. Suppose
that G and H are game positions. When player p˜ moves in the composite
game G + H, they move in either G or H, following the usual rules, and
leaves the other game component as it is. For example, if player p moved
to the option H ′ in game H, then the resulting game for the next player is
G +H ′, and so forth. Since, any disjunctive sum of game must be feasible,
we impose here that every play sequence in a CGF must be finite. Thus,
utility functions are well defined, independently of the sum played.
If the current player has no move in either game component G or H,
then the game is over, and utilities are computed as usual. This, ‘as usual’
21This is important, for addition of game positions including a state dependent turn
function (as in EGT) might be very complicated (and probably not possible).
22But not always. If not one can define a ruleset closure of all sums of positions in a
given ruleset; se e.g. [30, 26]. This is not necessary in our study. Therefore, our class has
potentially good properties for future theoretical work generalizing the current framework
of CGT to include general-sum, and so on.
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depends of course on that, for any Cumulative Game positions G and H,
the composite game G+H is a Cumulative Game position.
Let us therefore formally code the sum given individual Cumulative
Games. We define the elements of the new game. (The number of play-
ers is the same, and the turn function is not part of a game position, so it
need not be considered in the notion of disjunctive sum.)
1. Game positions: ωG+H = ωG + ωH .
2. Actions: AG+H = AG +AH .
3. Rewards: rG+H = rG + rH .
4. Utilities: uG+H = uG + uH .
We must justify/define the “+” for each item.
The main reason why all these items are well defined is that we treat
the game positions G and H as independent object, and this property is
carried over as a direct consequence of the definitions of Cumulative Games.
Notice that, if G consists of d heaps and H consists of d′ heaps, then the
(candidate) position G+H has d+ d′ heaps. Each heap has an independent
cumulation vector, so th use of “+” is well defined for game positions. When
a player chooses an action, it will be chosen according to AG or AH , and
this is a permitted action in AG+H . The rewards follow the actions so their
“+” is well defined. The utilities are added at the end of play as usual, so
this “+” is well defined. Hence, the sum of two Cumulative Games is again
a Cumulative Game.
Other properties of a class of combinatorial games are 1) Existence of
neutral element 2) Closure under taking options, i.e. each option of a game
is again a game 3) Closed under swapping game positions. For 1) take all
ω = (x,0), such that A(ω, p) = ∅, for all p ∈ [n]. 2) is direct by definition.
For 3) again, directly by definition, any couple of players may swap roles,
and the resulting game position is still a Cumulative Game.23
Thus, Cumulative Games satisfy the most important closure properties
for a class of Combinatorial Games. They are defined recursively, and they
have outcome functions. What remains is to define an order of games under
the disjunctive sum operation.
23Recently [20, 21] two more useful properties have been added to the list. 4) Parental
closure, i.e. any n finite subsets of games as options for the respective players represent
a game in the class 5) Dense, given any outcome matrix M and any game G, there is
another game H such that o(G+H) =M .
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To have a partially ordered heap monoid, one starts by defining the order
of outcome matrixesM and Q asM < Q if and only if all entriesmi,j and qi,j
represent the order mi,j < qi,j. Equality is the obvious definition, and thus
many matrixes are incomparable. This defines a partial order of outcomes.
We will at last state the partial order of games.
Definition 15. Let G and H be generic cumulative n-player games. Then
player p weakly prefers game G to game H, i.e. G >p H if, for all Cumulative
Games X, op(G + X) > op(H + X). That is, for all starting players j,
op(G+X, j) > op(H +X, j).
Theorem 9. The class of Cumulative Games is a partially ordered heap
monoid, under disjunctive sum, with respect to player j ∈ [n], say. Similarly,
the restriction to heap-size dynamic Cumulative Subtraction is a partially
ordered heap monoid.
Proof. Definition 15 is well defined, because of the closure of the disjunctive
sum operator: the outcome function takes a Cumulative Game as input.
Similarly, the sum of two heap-size dynamic games is again a heap size
dynamic game, and so, if we also restrict the “for all X” part in Definition 15,
we have another partial order.
Similarly, one can have a subclass of Cumulative Games where the re-
wards are cumulation independent (but where actions may depend on cu-
mulations), and this class would again satisfy all closure properties, and
therefore define a partial order specific for this class of games. In CGT, usu-
ally, when one restricts the class of attention, then the partial order changes.
This is mostly studied in the setting of Misère games (see [27, 34] for sur-
veys). Restriction to subclasses of games can be important to obtain efficient
reductions of games, to increase the sizes of the equivalence classes of games.
8 Strategic Equivalence of Games
Given a position ω0 and a previous player p0, we define the set of all possible
descendants under a given ruleset R as
DR(ω
0, p0) = {(ω, p) | there is an R-path from (ω0, p0) to (ω, p)}
For a given ruleset R and initial state s0 = (ω0, p0), let length(s) de-
note the number of actions from s0 to s ∈ DR(s0).24 Let rank(s0) =
24We are abusing notation here a bit, the reason being Observation 5 to come. We are
identifying states with paths, since they may not be uniquely identified otherwise in a
Cumulative Game.
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max{length(s) | s ∈ DR(ω
0, p0), p0 ∈ N}.
8.1 Every Cumulative Game is an Extensive Form Game
A ruleset R together with a game position ω = (x,C) and a utility function
u defines an n-tuple of Extensive Form Games. Every grounded Cumulative
Game is an Extensive Form Game.
Observation 5. Any grounded Cumulative Game, with an initial state ω0 ∈
Ω and a previous player p0 ∈ [n], defines a unique extensive form F =
([n], S, T, s0, δ, g), where
1. S = DR(ω0, p0);
2. T = {s ∈ S | A(s, γ(s)) = ∅};
3. s0 = (ω0, p0);
4. For any s = (ω, p) ∈ S, δ(s) = γ(ω, p);
5. For any s = (ω, p) ∈ S, g(s) = {
(
ω(a), γ(s)
)
: a ∈ A(s, γ(s))}, where
ω(a) = (x+ a,C + r(ω, p,a)).
Moreover, a grounded Cumulative Game together with a utility function u
defines the Extensive Form Game G = (F,U) where
6. For any t = (x,C) ∈ T and i ∈ [n], Ui(t) = ui(C, δ(t)).
Definition 16. We denote by G(R, γ,ω0, p0,u) the Extensive Form Game
induced by the the respective grounded Cumulative Game (R, γ,ω0, p0,u),
i.e. (ω0, p0) under form (R, γ) and utility u.
8.2 Any Extensive Form Game is a one heap Cumulative
Game
Since the move order is arbitrary in EG but cyclic in the heap games, we
cannot hope to find a heap game for each Extensive Form Game. However,
we can do almost as well by introducing equivalence classes of Extensive
Form Games.
Consider an Extensive Form Game G. We introduce a reduced form
of G, red(G) and a cyclic extension, cyc(G). The idea is that two games
are strategically equivalent if we bypass each child with exactly one option.
When there is no further bypass possible of G, we call this game red(G).
Reversely, we can adjoin a sequence of states (each state with exactly one
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child) between a parent and a child, to cycle-complete the game modulo the
n players. For any parent-child s, s′ such that δ(s′) = δ(s) + k, we connect
s, s′ using a path of k−1 states s1, . . . , sk−1 instead of the single edge (s, s′),
and where δ(si) = δ(s) + i, for all i. When each child is cycle-completed,
we call this game cyc(G). The terminal utilities remain the same, and note
that terminal states cannot be bypassed.
Theorem 10. For each Extensive Form Game G = ([n], S, T, s0, δ, g, U)
there exists a strategically equivalent grounded Cumulative Game with a single
heap.
Proof. Enumerate all states in S from s0 in preorder, so that every node
precedes all of its descendents. Denote by q(s) the index of s in this order,
and let Q = |S| be the maximal index. Since q is a one-to-one mapping
q : S → [Q], the function q−1(z) ∈ S in well defined, and we set s(x) =
q−1(Q− x).
W.l.o.g., δ(s′) is the same for all s′ ∈ g(s) (otherwise we can add dummy
states).
A position ω = (x,C) is valid if x+Cj = Q for all j ∈ N . Let Ω contain
all valid positions.
Intuitively, every state s in the original game G corresponds to a valid
grounded position with heap size x = Q − q(s), and where all players have
the same cumulation Cj = q(s). We complete the definition of the ruleset
R = ([n], d = 1,Ω, A, r) as follows. Set A(x) := {x − y : s(y) ∈ g(s(x))}.
The move order function γ is defined as γ(ω, p) := δ(s(x)) where ω = (x,C).
The (identical reward, identity) reward function is r(ω, a, p) := (a, a, . . . , a).
This means that if players start from some valid position ω = (x,C) then
after action a that reaches state ω = (x′,C ′), we will have that C ′j =
(Q− x) + a = (Q− x) + (x− x′) = Q− x′. Thus ω′ is also valid.
As we intended, every state s ∈ S in the original game G, induces a
unique valid position ωs = (x = Q − q(s),C = (q(s), q(s), . . . , q(s))) in the
new ruleset R.
The initial previous player p0 can be set arbitrarily, as γ essentially ig-
nores it.
Finally, we define the self-interest utility function as ui(Ci) := Ui(s(Ci))
if s(Ci) ∈ T and otherwise 0.
We claim that the game (R,ωs0 , p0, u) is equivalent to G. By induction,
every move from s = (ω, p) ∈ S to s′ = (ω′, p′) ∈ g(s) corresponds to a move
from ωs to ωs′ where p′ = γ(ω, p) plays action a = q(s′)−q(s) = x−x′. When
players in G reach a terminal t ∈ T and earn Ui(t) each, the corresponding
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player in (R,ωs0 , p0, u) gets ui(Ci) = Ui(s(Ci)) = Ui(s(q(t))) = Ui(t), as
required.
For example, if g(s) = {s′, s′′} and q(s) = 4, q(s′) = 10, q(s′′) = 13,
Q = 100 then s, s′, s′′ correspond to x = 96, x′ = 90, x′′ = 87, respectively.
A(96) = {96 − 90, 96 − 87} = {6, 9}. Note that A(x) = ∅ iff g(s(x)) = ∅,
i.e. iff s(x) ∈ T .
We have another proof of this result, slightly modified, namely where we
impose a cyclic turn function on the one heap game, which is the standard
in CGT.
Theorem 11. For each Extensive Form Game G = ([n], S, T, s0, δ, g, U)
there exists a strategically equivalent grounded Cumulative Game with a single
heap, and a cyclic turn function.
Proof. We construct a one heap game ∆, with x0 = 0 and C0 = 0, and we
will let the n players increase the heap size, assuming they have sufficient
budgets of pebbles. Study cyc(G). The, say a, children of s0, the root of
cyc(G), can be enumerated s1, . . . , sa. For each child si let the heap size be
x0 + i, so A(s0) = {1, . . . , a}, and the cumulation is updated trivially (no
rewards).
Study an arbitrary non-terminal node s at length(s) = ℓ, and suppose
that the heap sizes on level ℓ − 1 range between X and Y , with X < Y .
We enumerate all children at depth ℓ, denoted say sℓ,1, . . . sℓ,α, and let the
actions be Y −X,Y −X + 1, . . . , Y −X + α. These actions are applied to
the heap sizes of the parents at depth ℓ− 1 in increasing order, and we may
assume the parents were enumerated in non-decreasing order. Again, the
rewards are trivial, unless the action is to a terminal state. In this way we
obtain a 1-1 mapping of heap sizes with the original game states in the EG.
It remains to assign the correct utilities, and this will be achieved by setting
them to the corresponding rewards for each terminating action. Empty sets
of actions are attached to the terminal heap sizes.
Consider a cyclic turn function. By combining Observation 5 with The-
orem 11, a consequence is that any multi-heap game can be simulated by a
single heap game. In fact, this is somewhat simpler than the generic case
since a multi-heap game regarded as an Extensive Form Game is already
cycle-completed.
Corollary 12. Consider a cyclic turn function. Each grounded multi-heap
game has an equivalent one heap game. That is, their game trees and utilities
are the same.
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Proof. Combine Observation 5 with Theorem 10.
Observe that the projection of multiple heaps to one heap here is on layer
3, grounded positions, whereas the famous result that any multi-heap nim
position is equivalent to a single heap is a layer 2 result. Equivalence on
layer 2 is in general harder, and we will briefly return to this question in
Section 7.
In fact any combinatorial game with cyclic (or alternating) turns, with
a given starting player, is equivalent to a one heap Cumulative Game, since
grounded combinatorial games are Extensive Form Games.
9 Discussion
Let us return to the simpler cases of analysis, concerning zero-sum and self-
interest Subtraction Games. Any action, that is consistent with an outcome
function as in Definitions 2 and 5, will be called an optimal-action, in a given
context.
Observation 6 (Zero-sum versus Self-interest). One of the first general sum
questions for Subtraction Games is: for fixed heap sizes, and fixed subtrac-
tion sets, when do Definitions 2 and 5 assign the same optimal-action sets?
A first (probably correct) guess is that the antagonistic variation is much
closer to the zero-sum setting, than the friendly variation. One interesting
problem is to explore precisely how much closer that is. And we provide
some intuition via some preliminary computations.
For subtraction sets of size 2, we have not yet detected any difference
between zero-sum and self-interest antagonistic optimal-actions. But for the
friendly variation, the first difference appears already on the subtraction set
S = {3, 5}, at heap size 14, and where ozs(14) = 3, obtained by subtracting 5
pebbles, but o1si(14)−o
2
si(14) = 2, which is obtained by subtracting 3 pebbles.
For subtraction sets of size 3, we have detected the first difference of the
antagonistic and zero-sum variations for the subtraction set S = {6, 13, 17},
at a heap of size 76. The optimal action is either 6 or 17, and o1si(76) −
o2si(76) = 4, whereas ozs(76) = 5. Moreover, the number of such critical two
or three element subtraction sets with numbers weakly smaller than 20 is
one for the antagonistic case, whereas in the friendly case we find altogether
493 cases. If we increase 20 to 30 we find 16 and 2081cases respectively
and by increasing 30 to 40, we find 68 and 5386 cases respectively. We
conjecture that both these numbers grow towards infinity with maxS. Fix
a subtraction set. We conjecture that the outcome discrepancy is bounded
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(for either antagonistic or friendly tie breaking convention), and this would
be a corollary of another conjecture, that the greedy action is eventually an
optimal action for self-interest (independent of tie-breaking convention); this
was proved for zero-sum games in [5]. On the other hand, we conjecture that
the outcome discrepancy can be arbitrarily large when we let the subtraction
set vary.
Let us mention some examples where Pareto efficiency is the interesting
concept.
Example 6 (Tragedy of the Common). In welfare economics, for general
sum games, at the core of the heart is the notion of Pareto efficiency (PE).
A Pareto efficient play sequence is such that it is impossible to reallocate
the actions so as to make any one player better off without making another
one worse off. Here, we need to respect that the number of actions for the
starting (earlier) player is either the same as the other players or they have
one more action.
Consider the 2-player symmetric CS game S = {20, 31, 51}, playing from
x = 100, with identity rewards and identity utilities. The unique play se-
quence in PSPE is for player 1 to take 51, and then player 2 takes 31. At
this point, no further action is possible. Any other play from player 1 would
give player 2 the opportunity to take 51, and so she would get at most 31.
However, there is a solution, which is better for both players. It is when both
players have agreed beforehand to take 20 in each move. Then all resources
will be allocated, which implies Pareto efficiency.
Returning to the main example with S = {2, 3} with identity rewards
and identity utilities. Then, playing from any heap size it is easy to see
that the outcome is Pareto efficient, both for antagonistic and cooperative
tie break rule.
The smallest symmetric subtraction game that is not Pareto efficient for
many heap sizes is S = {3, 7}, and the first starting position that fails is
x = 30. The reason is that player 1 cannot afford to make a big sacrifice
and play 3. Because then player 2 easily responds with 7, and now player 1
starts from a heap of size 20, which has game value (10, 10). Thus the utility
would be 13, when they obtain 14 by playing 7 twice. But clearly a Pareto
efficient cooperation would yield the utility (15, 15).
We propose a resolution to the tragedy of the common in the setting
of Cumulative Games. By introducing a principal-agent situation, one can
offer a solution to the tragedy of the common in Example 6, by letting the
principal choose the reward functions, and the agents play as usual, given the
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suggested reward function by the principal. So, when they play they seek
to maximize the utility as defined here. However, there is a second stage
of game, when the principal reveals their ‘true utilities’, and in the example
they are simply their respective sum of their actions: set the rewards for each
action to r(s) = −s. Then indeed the Pareto (efficient) solution is achieved.
In this way, rewards can be seen as a way to correct incitements that go
wrong because of perhaps too individualistic behavior.
Memory A big class of games in the Normal play theory is games with
memory, with the specific meaning that the action set, may depend on pre-
vious actions (in full generality the action sets may depend on all history of
a game). The results in this paper will still hold, but with more cumbersome
notation, so we omit this class of games. The most famous such game in the
Normal play theory is Fibonacci nim [36], which depends only on the most
recent action, and it has recently been generalized to multi heap situations
[22, 23]. Another game in this family that has deeper memory is Imita-
tion nim [15]. Here we let any memory (including possible dependencies) be
stored in a cumulation vector. In theory we could have memory be more
general, but the point is to have some natural restrictions. We feel that, for
an economic type game, the available actions may depend on the players’
cumulations/budgets/endowments etc, but ‘how’ they got to their present
cumulations can be ignored.
Cyclic games A natural extension of the current work is to study Cumu-
lative Games with cycles. One can define various results ‘in the limit’, using
standard lim sup and lim inf maps of results along strategy profiles, and thus
generalize the outcome functions.
Philosophy We mentioned one difference between EG and CG: it is given
who starts in EG but not in CG. Another major distinction concerns the
movability, and in particular ‘who gets to make the final move’, often it
is useful to have more moves than your opponent, and this is the de facto
standard that all CGT should be put in relation with. Extensive Form
Games are often more utility oriented, and the notion of who moves last
is rarely the most important issue. In fact, even for sequential games the
standard assumption is that each player declare their strategies, and so the
move ability is rarely mentioned. It suffices to know the players’ strategy
profile, and then their utilities follow. So the underlying philosophy used to
be quite different. Here we show that they need not be that different.
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Can we have non-trivial game comparison for self-interest Cumu-
lative Games? If one aspires big equivalence classes of games, in the spirit
of Normal play theory, then it would have to be defined with respect to a
given player p, as we do in Definition 15. For this to be interesting, one would
most likely have to restrict the class of games, and the first step would be
to find a class of games such that the equivalence class of 0 is non-trivial.
Indeed, a first step in this direction has been taken in that Normal play
CGT is bridged with Scoring-play CGT in a useful restriction of the full
class of Scoring Games [31] to the class of Guaranteed Scoring [18, 17] in
which Normal play is order embedded; the full class has only the trivial
neutral element, whereas for Guaranteed Scoring the equivalence class of
neutral elements contain all 0s of Normal play. This recent Scoring-play de-
velopment started with Ettinger’s seminal Ph.D thesis [9]; he extended the
Milnor-type positional (nonnegative incentive scoring play) games to include
so-called zugzwangs (where no player wants to start), a common concept in
recreational play.
Solve wealth play Wealth play as introduced in the Prologue is a partizan
Normal play 2-player game, and it is all small (if one player has a move,
then the other player has a move) if we assume that all heaps start with
cumulations at least (1, 1) (and otherwise it is trivial). Hence, in the context
of a disjunctive sum of games, the notion of atomic weights [1, 33] will readily
arrive as a tool. Thus, a first step to characterize these games would be to
determine heap sizes atomic weights as a function of the players current
cumulations. Atomic weights are a rough measure of how many times you
can afford to ‘pass’ (or wait) in any given component. Of course, if you lead
by a certain amount in one component, then a move there is not urgent, but
it could be more useful to accumulate more wealth (which here corresponds
to ‘ability to wait’) in a neighboring game component, and this is the essence
of atomic weigh play (roughly, if your atomic weight is two steps ahead, then
you are safe for winning). We propose this game, as a step forward to develop
an economic branch of classical CGT.
10 Normal play CGT, an overview
The Normal play convention in CGT means that the player with no avail-
able options loses the game. The most well known game played with this
convention is Nim [4] (players take-away any number of pebbles from one
heap out of many). However, the game of nim is impartial (players have
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the same options), and within the disjunctive sum theory, which is one of
the fundaments of CGT, all impartial games are pairwise incomparable. Let
us review the building blocks of the more interesting partizan game theory
(players may have different options), by using examples of heap games, and
more specifically partizan subtraction games.
Within the partizan Normal play theory, there are many comparable
games, and for example, if Left’s subtraction set is {1, 4}, whereas Right’s
subtraction set is {2, 3}. Then, if G is the heap of 4 pebbles, and H is the
heap of 3 pebbles, then, within the Normal play theory, Left prefers G before
H. As we will explain in the coming, this will follow, since Left wins the game
“G −H” independently of who starts. We encourage the reader to ponder
upon this observation, while we lay out the Normal play foundations in the
spirit of this paper, staying close to the theory of Cumulative (Subtraction)
Games.
10.1 Subtraction Games
In this section we consider a specific class of partizan games known as sub-
traction games, which are the basis for our general definition of Cumulation
games in the main text.
Let the two players be Luise (Left) and Richard (Right).25 In some more
generality, than in the Introduction, we let the subtraction set depend on the
position presented by the previous player. Combinatorial games are defined
in terms of their sets of move options [1], so we follow this approach. Since
the two players alternate turns, we often refer to the players by the current
player, i.e. the player who is about to take an action, and a previous player,
i.e. the other player. We will adopt a convention: the previous player is
called player p, and the current player is player p˜.
Let N = {1, 2, . . .}. The standard notation for subtraction games is (as
we wrote in the Introduction) S ⊂ N, but for two reasons we will instead use
sets of the form A ⊂ N. The first reason is the we will use the letter S for
the game states in extensive form games, and the second reason is that in
general Cumulation games will allow addition as well, so later we will have
A ⊂ Z. Thus, we may think of the letter A as ‘addition’ or perhaps ‘action’.
From a notational point of view, we will depart slightly from CGT-
traditions. Typically we let the previous player define the setting (instead
of using the current player); the current position, the possible actions, the
25In CGT the players are often called Lefteft and Rightight. The naming is after Richard
Guy, who did so much for the field of CGT, and his wife Luise.
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outcome and so on will be labeled by the previous player.26
Definition 17 (Subtraction Games, Normal play). A 2-player Subtraction
Game is defined in three layers. A ruleset (a generalization of a subtraction
set) is a function S : N0 × {Left,Right} → 2N, which takes as input a heap
size and a (previous) player.27
1. The heap space is N0;
2. A heap position is an ordered pair (x,S), where x ∈ N0 is the size of a
heap of pebbles, and S is a ruleset.
3. A grounded position is a triple (x,S, p), where (x,S) is a position, and
where p is the previous player.
A grounded position is identified with its sets of options, which is
(x, p) = {(x− s, p˜) | s ∈ S(x, p)}, (18)
where p˜ is the current player. The game ends when the current player,
player p˜, cannot move, i.e. (x,S, p) = ∅, and the previous player, player p,
wins.
A game is played by agreeing on an initial grounded position (x0, p0), i.e.
a starting position x0 and a previous player p0. Then the players take turns
moving as prescribed (18), until one of the players cannot take any action,
and thereby loses.
Example 7. Let S = {2, 3} be a fixed and symmetric ruleset. An instance of
a position is (7, {2, 3}), and the corresponding grounded position when Left
starts is (7, {2, 3},Right). Thus a move option is (4, {2, 3},Left). From here
Right has a winning move to (1, {2, 3},Right) = ∅.28 Indeed, our notation
reveals the winner, in the sense that if (x,S, p) = ∅, then player p wins.
The way we think about the three layers in Definition 17, starts with
that the function S encodes the game. Likewise to (18), a heap position is
identified with the set of grounded positions, one for each previous player,
26In the much younger tradition of games with a Muller twist (a.k.a. blocking maneuver)
this is indeed the standard; see e.g. [15, 6].
27We say that a ruleset S is valid if s ≤ x for any grounded position (x, p) and s ∈
S(x, p). We assume unless stated otherwise that all rulesets we consider are valid.
28For fixes rulesets such as S = {2, 3}, for terminal positions, we abuse notation and
write (1, {2, 3},Right) = ∅ instead of (1,∅,Right) = ∅.
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and so (x, S) is identified with the set {(x,S,Left), (x,S,Right)}. The heap
space together with the ruleset S is identified with the set of heap positions,
one for each heap size, i.e. the set {(x,S) | x ∈ N0}.
For example, the picture to the left in Figure 4 (page 50) describes for
the game tree identified with position (7, {2, 3}), which is a subtree of an in-
finite non-rooted game tree identified with the fixed ruleset S = {2, 3}. The
three layers of a game (as in Definition 17) are essential to this study, bridg-
ing combinatorial game theory (CGT) and classical game theory (EGT).
Grounded game positions (layer 3), together with the Normal play winning
condition, are extensive form games from EGT.
10.2 Outcome Functions
The reason we need to define the first two layers, is that some important
concepts in CGT are defined explicitly on these layers. The first of these
concepts is the outcome function (which describes the result of a perfect, or
rational, play), which partitions games into equivalence classes. We begin
by reviewing this function in its traditional setting.
We state the four outcome classes for classical CGT (assuming general
partizan play). The definitions are written in general terms but using our
definitions of subtraction games. For readers with EGT background, the
recursive definition of the outcome function is similar to the backward in-
duction solution of extensive form zero-sum games, where Left is the max-
imizing player. CGT assumes by convention that both players play their
optimal strategies.
Definition 18 (Classical CGT outcomes [1]). Consider a ruleset S. The
result (utility) of an acyclic Normal play grounded position, is either Left
wins (result L) or Right wins (result R). By convention, we treat the two
results as being ordered, with L > R. Let
o(x,Right) = max{o(Z,Left), R},
where Z runs over all options of (x,Right), and let
o(x,Left) = min{o(Z,Right), L},
where Z runs over all options of (x,Left). The (perfect play) outcome at
position (x,S) is a pair o(x) = (o(x,Right), o(x,Left)).29
29By convention, max(∅) = −∞ and min(∅) =∞.
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Thus o(x,Right) is the result (either L or R) in perfect play if Left starts,
and similar for Right. Note that the games are zero-sum, so in EGT (layer 3),
the result corresponds to the usual value of a game, either L or R. Thus
there are four possible outcomes at the outset:
• The outcome L means that Left wins independently of who starts, i.e.,
o(x) = (L,L);
• The outcome R means that Right wins independently of who starts,
i.e., o(x) = (R,R);
• The outcome P (for “Previous") means that the player who does not
start wins, i.e., o(x) = (R,L);
• The outcome N means that the player who starts wins, i.e., o(x) =
(L,R).
Given a ruleset S, we say that x is a Z position if o(x) = Z ∈ {L,R,P,N}.
Note that symmetric games have only P and N positions.
As discussed in the main part of this paper, one of the main idea of acyclic
combinatorial rulesets, is that one can recursively compute the outcome class
of each game position. The first example, is the case of impartial (symmetric)
Normal play games: a game is a P position if all its options are N positions,
and otherwise it is an N position. Observe that this implies that each
terminal position is a P position.
Note that the total order of the results imply that the partizan play
outcomes are partially ordered, with L > N > R,L > P > R, but where N
and P are incomparable.
Example 8 (Outcomes of Normal play Subtraction). Consider S = {2, 3},
as in Example 7. The initial outcomes are:
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
starting player o(x) P P N N N P P N
Left o(x,Right) R R L L L R R L
Right o(x,Left) L L R R R L L R
In Figure 4 we display optimal play from a heap of size 7, via the use of a
directed acyclic graph representation (DAG). The outcome is N , and thus
there must exist a winning move option (independently of who starts). By
inspection, the unique winning subtraction is 7 − 2 = 5 (so Left picked the
wrong option in Example 7). Note that the left DAG in Fig. 4 contains all
the information on the ruleset, up to position 7.
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Figure 4: The leftmost picture shows a DAG representation of the position
(7, {2, 3}), and the picture to the right shows the corresponding outcomes.
Example 9 (Outcomes of a partizan game). Let S = ({2, 3}, {1, 4}) be a
fixed partizan ruleset (Thus Left subtracts 2 or 3 and Right subtracts 1 or
4). The initial outcomes are:
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
starting player o(x) P R N L R N L P
Left o(x,Right) R R L L R L L R
Right o(x,Left) L R R L R R L L
Consider optimal play from a heap of size 7. The outcome is P, because
Left has options to L (7− 2) and R (7− 3), whereas Right has both options
to L (7 − 1 and 7 − 4). However if we start from position x = 6, then Left
wins regardless of who starts.
10.3 Disjunctive Sum
Let G1 and G2 be the subtraction games defined in Examples 7 and 9,
respectively, both with heaps of size 7.
The disjunctive sum G + H is a combinatorial game on two heaps, G
and H (and note that, in its literal form, it is not a subtraction game as
per Definition 17). In every turn, the current player must make a move in
exactly one of those games, following the rules: Right may remove 2 or 3
pebbles from either heap, whereas Left may either remove 2 or 3 pebbles
from the first heap, or 1 or 4 pebbles from the second. As usual, a player
that has no available option loses the game. Note that G includes both the
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ruleset and the position. Thus the disjunctive sum operation takes place at
layer 2.
If we extend the class of Subtraction Games to games with multiple piles,
then it is not necessarily closed under the disjunctive sum operation. But, of
course, it is closed in the class of all Normal play games. Note that we can
also add Subtraction Games to other combinatorial games such as Nim or
Chomp, with the same Normal play rule. Open problem: for what subclasses
of (Normal play) Subtraction Games are all composite games equivalent to
a single heap game? This problem requires an explanation:
10.4 Games comparison
The importance of both the outcome function and the disjunctive sum op-
eration comes into light when we want to compare games. Whether a game
G is “good” for player Left may depend on the context: a-priori, Left may
have a winning strategy in G but not in G+X for some other game X.
Definition 19. Consider Normal play games G and H. Then G ≥D H if
o(G+X) ≥ o(H +X) for any Normal play game X.
It turns out that the outcome function contains the entire information on
the game G under any possible context! The ≥D relation is a partial order
over all Normal play games. Any two games can be compared, and it assures
that Left weakly prefers the game G before the game H, in any situation
that may occur, that is in any disjunctive sum play. Notice in this sense that
outcome equivelance is a much weaker definition, and not sufficient to guide
the players, for example in a play on several heaps (subtraction game).
The Fundamental Theorem of Normal play, is that the for all X part of
the definition disappears and game comparison simplifies to: G >D H if and
only if Left wins the game G −H = G + (−H) playing second, where −H
is the game H, where the players have swapped roles. This result uses that
Normal play is a group structure, and that mimic is the way to prove that
G−G = 0, i.e. that G−G is a P-position. Game comparison in any other
class of combinatorial games should at least be put in relation to this elegant
result, that paved the way for modern CGT.
Let us finish off the example in the beginning of this section, with sub-
traction sets as in Example 9. So, G is the heap of size 4, and H is the heap
of size 3, and thus, we wonder if Left wins G−H = G+(−H) independently
of who starts. Thus, we reverse the roles of the players in the game H, so
Left (Right) has the subtraction set {2, 3} ({1, 4}) in the game −H. If Left
starts she can win by eliminating the G component. Now Right must remove
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one pebble from the heap of size 3, and so Left wins by removing the last
two pebbles. If Right starts, then he can remove 2 or 3 from the heap of
size 4, or he can remove 1 from the heap of size 3. If he removes 2, then
Left wins by removing 1 more from the G component. If he removes 3, then
Left wins by eliminating the H component. If he removes 1, then Left wins
by eliminating this heap. The reader may fill in the missing last move(s).
Hence, we know that in any Normal play situation, Left will prefer the heap
of size 4 before the heap of size 3.
This served to illustrate an elegant and playful argument to prove an
abstract mathematical entity, that distinguishes combinatorial games from
other areas of mathematics. We are not yet aware of any similar result for
the general class of Cumulative Games, and we believe that the general class
must be much restricted to approach constructive game comparison, in for
example a class of pure self-interest games.
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